Towards Security Analysis of OpenStack by Maleki, Hoda
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School
4-26-2019
Towards Security Analysis of OpenStack
Hoda Maleki
University of Connecticut - Storrs, hoda.maleki@uconn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Maleki, Hoda, "Towards Security Analysis of OpenStack" (2019). Doctoral Dissertations. 2181.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/2181
Towards Security Analysis of OpenStack
Hoda Maleki, Ph.D.
University of Connecticut, 2019
OpenStack is the prevalent open-source, non-proprietary package for managing cloud
services and data centers. It is highly complex and consists of multiple inter-related
components which are developed by separate, loosely coordinated groups. All of
these properties make the security analysis of OpenStack both a crucial mission and
a challenging one. In this dissertation, we demonstrate how we can provide a rigor-
ous, perceptible and holistic security analysis of OpenStack. We base our modeling
and security analysis in the universally composable (UC) security framework, which
has been so far used mainly for analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols.
Indeed, demonstrating how the UC framework can be used to argue about security-
sensitive systems which are mostly non-cryptographic, in nature, is one of the main
contributions of this work.
Our analysis has the following key features:
1. It is user-centric: It stresses the security guarantees given to users of the system,
in terms of privacy, correctness, and timeliness of the services.
2. It provides defense in depth: It considers the security of OpenStack even when
some of the components are compromised. This departs from the traditional
design approach of OpenStack, which assumes that all services are fully trusted.
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3. It is modular : It formulates security properties for individual components and
uses them to assert security properties of the overall system.
We formulate ideal functionalities that correspond to several OpenStack modules
and then prove the security of the overall OpenStack protocol given the ideal compo-
nents. The modeling paves the way toward a comprehensive analysis of OpenStack: it
is extensible to the addition of new components and modular to an intra-component
analysis.
It turns out that some salient issues come up even at this relatively high level of
representation and analysis. Specifically, we demonstrate that the scoping of permis-
sions given by users to proxy tokens causes the overall security to fail as soon as any
one of the components fails. We propose an alternative, more finely scoped token
mechanism and assert that the new mechanisms suffice for regaining overall security
even when some of the components are faulty.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
OpenStack is an open-source software package for data centers and virtualization ser-
vices, including remote computation, storage, networking, and related services. The
OpenStack project began in 2010 as a collaboration between two groups: Rackspace,
a public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provider selling cloud services, and NASA,
a part of the United States government that wanted to take advantage of the elastic-
ity and datacenter efficiency benefits that come from combining different workloads
into a single private cloud [40]. Since then, it has grown to be a large open source
project with over 9 million lines of code, and over 6,000 contributors and hundreds
of implementations around the world [60, 27]. There is a governance body [11] that
actively manages the development and stability of OpenStack.
Analyzing security properties of large-scale information systems, such as Open-
Stack, is a daunting task.
A first challenge is to provide the high-level abstraction of the system with all the
interactions between its components. At first glance this may seem trivial since large-
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scale systems are subdivided into components managed by different teams. Neverthe-
less, understanding the overall picture of how these components connect and influence
each other is a non-trivial task. Indeed, interviewing all these different teams/experts
in order to abstract the high-level interaction needs a great amount of time and effort.
A second challenge, that is almost intractable in and of itself, is to adequately
articulate and rigorously express the security requirements of the system in the first
place. Indeed, adequately capturing even simple, intuitive concerns is non-trivial.
Furthermore, security is often inseparable from the expected functionality, which
is complex in and of itself. It also invariably has multiple facets and competing
requirements that need to be reconciled.
A third challenge is to rigorously assert the specified properties. This challenge
is even more daunting, especially when the system consists of multiple components
and one has to take into account inter-component interactions, potential failure of
individual components, and the associated potential vulnerabilities.
Modular security analysis The natural way to deal with such complexities is
modularity: formulate and assert the security properties of individual components,
and then deduce security properties of the overall, composite system from the security
properties of the components, as well as those of the way in which the components are
put together. This breaks down the overall analysis into multiple steps where each
step deals with a much simpler system. Furthermore, when successful, the analysis
would deduce the overall security of the system from the security of the components,
and the security of the overall design given the components. Still, breaking down a
system to components in a way that allows for effective composable security analysis
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is a non-trivial task in and of itself.
A number of frameworks for modular security analysis for cryptographic protocols
have been developed over the years, e.g. [45, 6, 13, 5, 51, 33, 20, 9]. Furthermore, a
number of works have used these frameworks to analyze security of security-sensitive
systems that are non-cryptographic in nature,e.g. [9, 14, 25, 26, 17]. Extending these
cryptographic frameworks to handle systems with complex interfaces and sizeable
codebase is a challenging endeavor — but one that holds great promise. In particular,
it opens the door to a rigorous, yet modular and approachable security analysis of
large-scale software systems. Indeed, such analysis can be very valuable even in
systems that use little or no cryptography.
Our contributions In this work, we initiate modular security analysis of Open-
Stack, which is a large-scale distributed system with complex interfaces whose security
is important to many cloud computing use cases. We perform our analysis within the
Universally Composable (UC) security framework, which provides a way to articu-
late security properties rigorously and precisely. We choose to use the UC for our
analysis because its modularity and composability aligns well with the structure of
OpenStack.
In terms of security guarantees and analysis, the OpenStack consortium offers an
extensive and illuminating security guide [43]. However, this guide concentrates on
security measures for protecting the OpenStack package itself from external intruders
and attackers. Other literature on the security of OpenStack (e.g. [4, 59, 24, 3, 48, 21])
also concentrates on individual components and mitigation of specific attack vectors.
By contrast, to our knowledge we are the first to model and assert the overall security
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guarantees that the OpenStack services individually and collectively provide to its
users. We emphasize that in this work, we are not doing formal/symbolic/automated
analysis. Clearly, it would be great if we could do the proofs within a pl-style formal
framework. However, the main contribution here should be seen as not so much the
proof, but the dissection of the problem and determining ‘what’ it is that we want
to prove (i.e. the functionalities). This is a task that cannot be mechanized with
current technology, and this is where our main contribution lies.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• Demonstrate the viability of Universally Composable (UC) security analyses for
a system with the complexity of OpenStack.
• Describe the interaction between the main OpenStack components, while ab-
stracting the ∼9 million of lines of code that collectively realize these compo-
nents.
• Analyze the composite security provided collectively by these OpenStack com-
ponents, and how security of the whole is impacted if some of the parts are
corrupted.
• Propose a specification for an improved token mechanism, along with an analysis
of the concrete security improvements it offers to OpenStack.
Lessons Learned The main challenge/goal of the high-level design is to provide
a sufficiently nimble and fine-grained access control mechanism where users will be
able to create and configure tasks that involve multiple services and at the same
time, keep rogue entities from gaining undesired access. This is further complicated
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by the fact that users may not be aware of all the services they are using and so, the
services themselves should be able to act on behalf of users. We investigate the current
mechanism, which is based on a token that contains the access control information
for the task at hand and what is being passed in all communications. We point out
how some design flaws are manifested in the current formalism and then, propose
and analyze an alternative token mechanism. The UC framework is critical in several
levels: (a) it allowed us to identify the above issue (it is hard to lose sight of it when
dealing with all details at once). (b) it allowed us to define security of the mechanism,
and rigorously assert that the proposed mechanism satisfies the definition.
Security weaknesses formalized and contextualized The main security
challenge in a multi-tenant data center management system like OpenStack is to
provide an appropriately fine-grained, yet secure mechanism for controlling the access
of users (and agents of these users within the system) to services. This includes
controlling access to compute, storage, networking, and other services, as well as
preventing users from stepping into each others data and virtual machines. Indeed,
much of our attention has been focused on analyzing the mechanisms provided by
OpenStack to provide this control.
More broadly, we believe this value two-fold: spotlighting and contextualizing the
impact of known weaknesses in OpenStack, and providing a framework in which to
evaluate the value added by proposed countermeasures.
The design of OpenStack implicitly assumes that all components of an OpenStack-
based service are trusted. Our work demonstrates that as long as this assumption
holds, the OpenStack design indeed provides adequate security: namely, secrecy and
5
correctness of data and computations. Conversely, our analysis formally shows the
extent to which OpenStack is vulnerable (and also the extent to which it remains
safe) when a subset of components is compromised.
We remark that the case where some components become compromised is quite
realistic. Indeed, one known security concern within OpenStack is that the VM
manager Nova is more susceptible to attack than other services because it is exposed
to a richer attack surface from malicious VMs. Specifically, if an attacker is able
to compromise only one VM by exploiting any vulnerability, then in fact he can
compromise the compute node hosting the VM and get the credential of the compute-
node. By having the credential of one compute-node, the attacker can observe or
even modify all the messages in Nova’s message queue, including all tokens passed
to Nova [56]. This realistic example shows that it is prudent to design the system so
as to minimize the damage from the compromise of individual components, and to
perform analysis that provides some security guarantees even in the case that some
components are adversarially controlled.
Another known weakness in OpenStack is its bearer token mechanism to authen-
ticate users and verify their authorization to access resources. Bearer tokens given
by OpenStack’s credentialing service Keystone effectively permit a user to pass her
credentials to services that can then make actions on her behalf. As long as the
communication between services is secured via point-to-point secure session proto-
cols (say, via TLS), this mechanism provides security against external attackers that
only control the network. However, this mechanism allows a corrupted component
(say, Nova) to impersonate tokens on behalf of any user. When the inter-process
communication is not secured in a point-to-point way, any rogue OpenStack entity
that can eavesdrop to the inter-service communication (say, a hypervisor that was
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compromised by its tenant VM) can potentially have access to all current bearer to-
kens in the system. Indeed, previous works (e.g. [18]) have already pointed out this
weakness and proposed limiting the scope of these bearer tokens by setting expira-
tion times and other scoping mechanisms.1 It should be stressed that, upon each
new use of the token, each new service verifies the token again with Keystone. Ergo,
tokens that are invalid will not cause damage. However, when the tokens are broadly
scoped, nothing prevents a rogue component from using legitimate tokens of existing
unsuspecting users to compromise both the integrity and the secrecy of their data.
This work analyses OpenStack with two token mechanisms. First, we analyze
OpenStack’s existing bearer tokens. Our analysis formulates that the current Open-
Stack realizes an “ideal cloud” specification that provides little security as soon as
any component is corrupted. We then specify the attributes of a stronger one-time
token mechanism; we show that the additional security provided by the limitation to
one-time use, together with the ability to identify the entity that provides the token,
suffices for realizing a significantly stronger variant of the ideal cloud specification
that limits the damage caused by corrupted services.
Towards modular and mechanized analysis While our model only covers
the main components of OpenStack, it is quite extensible. Using the UC composition
theorem, future work could easily build upon this work to represent the inner workings
of each OpenStack service. Furthermore, adding a new service to the model only
requires four steps: instantiate a model of the new service, apply local changes to the
1For simplicity of exposition we leave the timeout mechanism (as well as measurement of real time)
outside the model. We note that timing mechanisms can be added in a relatively straightforward way,
using the UC-style modeling of network time of Canetti et al. [15]. Indeed, the ability to modularly
add the consideration of time is another demonstration of the power of composable security analysis.
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affected functionalities, edit the ideal cloud, and augment the simulator. Creation of
a new service FService is modular, the second and third steps are very simple to do, and
our work shows that a domain specific language for UC functionalities could easily
permit the construction of simulators that can be augmented as easily as possible.
One of the most important aspects of this work, that sets it apart from many pre-
vious works in the UC framework, is that we provide in full detail the specifications
of the ideal cloud and the individual services, as well as the descriptions of the simu-
lators and the proofs of security, without glossing over steps. As a consequence, our
proofs and specifications are decently long and tedious. Indeed, while for this work we
sticked to hand written proofs, we believe that our modeling and analysis are readily
amenable to mechanization, and also to some level of automation. Natural candidates
for tools that would enable such mechanized analysis include the EasyCrypt tool [7],
the FCF tool [44], or the CryptHOL tool [8].
1.1 Outline of the Dissertation
We begin in Chapter 2 by providing some background for OpenStack, UC framework,
and points to some related works. We also explain the obstacles we faced while deal-
ing with the analysis. Chapter 3 describes our approach toward the security analysis
of OpenStack and provides an informal account of our modeling of OpenStack ser-
vices and the security properties we chose to model. We use an example workflow to
highlight the modularity of our design. In Chapter 4, we fully specify the functionali-
ties for the OpenStack services and an idealized monolithic cloud, and then we prove
that the former UC-realizes the latter. Then, we present a stronger token mechanism
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in Chapter 5, and we perform another UC analysis in Chapter 6 to prove that our
new tokens improve the security of OpenStack in the event that some services are
compromised. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of future work in Chapter 7.
1.2 Publications
Conference papers that are accepted and published with primary authorship include
[58, 38, 37, 39]:
1. M. van Dijk, C. Jin H. Maleki, P. H. Nguyen, and R. Rahaeimehr, “Weak-
Unforgeable Tags for Secure Supply Management,” 22nd International Confer-
ence on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2018. (Acceptance rate:
26%, authors are ordered in alphabetical order)
2. H. Maleki, R. Rahaeimehr and M. van Dijk “SoK: A Survey of Clone Detection
Approaches in RFID-based Supply Chains,” Workshop on Attacks and Solutions
in Hardware Security, 2017. (Acceptance rate: 30%)
3. H. Maleki, R. Rahaeimehr, C. Jin, and M. van Dijk “New clone-detection
approach for RFID-based supply chains,” 2017 IEEE International Symposium
on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, 2017. (Acceptance rate for long
paper: 20%)
4. H. Maleki, S. Valizadeh, W. Koch, A. Bestavros, and M. van Dijk “Markov
Modeling of Moving Target Defense Games,” Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
Workshop on Moving Target Defense, 2016. (Acceptance rate: 34%, Two first
authors share the first authorship)
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Currently submitted conference paper with primary authorship include [30]:
1. K. Hogan, H. Maleki, R. Rahaeimehr, R. Canetti, M. van Dijk, J. Hen-
nessey, M. Varia, and H. Zhang, “On the Universally Composable Security
of OpenStack,” submitted to IEEE Secure Development Conference. http://
ePrint.iacr.org/. 2019. (Three first authors share the first authorship)
Under process conference paper with co-authorship:
1. R. Rahaeimehr, C. Jin, H. Maleki, P. H. Nguyen, and M. van Dijk “Secure
Supply Chain Management: How to Combine the Benefits of both NVM and
PUF based Schemes,” submitting process.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 OpenStack Platform
OpenStack is a modular, distributed, open-source cloud computing software stack
for providing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) to multiple (potentially untrusting)
users. Originally developed by Rackspace and NASA to meet their public and private
cloud needs [40], OpenStack has grown to be a large open-source project that consists
of several distinct services that offer particular functionality, like identity authenti-
cation and authorization, Virtual Machine (VM) computation, block data storage,
networking, and VM image management. Services are independent, both in devel-
opment, where each service has a separate team and design, and in deployment by
cloud providers, where each service can be managed and scaled separately. Services
are flexible, giving cloud providers many options through plugins (where mass well as
the ability to horizontally scale from small to large environments). For example, the
compute service (called Nova) has plugins supporting different hypervisors, including
11
Microsoft HyperV, Xen and VMware.
2.1.1 Modular services
The design of OpenStack is inherently modular, with 23 modules where each module
has some pre-specified functionality, as well as interfaces with the other modules it
interacts with. It should be noted though that the functionality of the interfaces is
not completely pinned down; indeed some modules have multiple implementations
that provide slightly different functionality. Also many of the modules allow for a
variety of underlying software packages as plug-ins. Some of the main modules of
OpenStack include (Fig 2.1):
Nova (compute): Compute service is a major part of an IaaS platforms. It manages
the creation, maintenance and removal of virtual machines (VMs).
Glance (image repository): Stores and manages the images loaded to VMs.
Cinder & Swift (block & object storage): Manage the storage of data (in blocks,
volumes, and more general objects) for VMs.
Neutron (networking): Provides internal and external virtual networks for VMs.
Keystone (access control and key management): Holds the permission infor-
mation controlling the access of users to the services and data. Interacts with
users and all other modules to enforce the permission policies.
Horizon (user-side dashboard): Provides an interface between users of the sys-
tem and its service modules.
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Figure 2.1: OpenStack’s main components and their interaction.
Each one of these modules is a complex, distributed system in and of itself, some-
times with multiple subdivisions, plug-ins, and alternative implementations.
In addition to these main services, the system administrator may take advantage of
other services provided in Table 2.1 . The list of these services is constantly growing.
2.1.2 Tokens
To determine a user’s project and role, Keystone gives the user a bearer token after
authenticating with their credentials (e.g., username and password); users include
this token in API requests to other services for authentication and authorization.
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Table 2.1: Optional Services in OpenStack Platform
Service Name Service Type
Trove Database
Sahara Elastic Map Reduce
Ironic Bare-Metal Provisioning
Zaqar Messaging Service
Manila Shared Filesystems
Designate DNS Service
Barbican Key Management
Magnum Container
Murano Application Catalog
Congress Governance
Ceilometer Telemetry
Heat Orchestration
Services pass this token to Keystone, which returns back a (project,role) tuple if the
token was valid. Services then make all authorization decisions based on that tuple.
Bearer tokens are used similarly in other popular protocols, like OAuth [31]. Because
possession of a bearer tokens grants access to resources, care must be taken to protect
them from unauthorized parties using methods like TLS [43].
Service interactions on behalf of an end user allow for more complicated tasks
such as attaching storage volumes to a compute node. The compute service is able to
send a user’s token to the storage service which can in turn verify with the identity
service that this token has access to the requested volume and attach it to a node
without needing to check with the end user itself.
OpenStack uses plugins to Keystone to implement tokens, the most popular being
UUID and Fernet [42]. UUID tokens issue random, universally unique identifiers [35]
to users after a successful first authentication with Keystone, and stores them in a
database with other required information such as expiration time, the project and
role associated with it.
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The Fernet token is a recent innovation that uses cryptography to provide authen-
ticity without accessing a central DB. It is a mechanism by which keystone creates
a private, authenticated channel to itself. It has quickly become the preferred token
format for OpenStack as they do not require maintaining a central database of valid
tokens, which adds network load and latency.
2.1.3 Trust model
Many of OpenStack’s design choices and security issues stem from its broad trust
model, which assumes that all services act as faithful user agents. Providing security
even in the case where some services are comporomized does not appear to be a design
goal. Furthermore, interactions between services in OpenStack are optimized in light
of this trust. However, OpenStack’s unprotected interior means that a (partially)
compromised service can do a great deal of harm: acquiring a single bearer token
allows the compromised service to impersonate the user for any subsequent action.
Looking ahead, in Chapters 3 we will discuss the security assertions in the case of
service corruption.
2.2 Universally Composable Security
In this chapter, we summarize the UC security framework [13]; the framework that we
use for our security analysis. Here, we provide a high-level overview of the framework
as the low-level technical details are not important to follow the rest of this thesis.
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2.2.1 Interactive Turing Machine (ITM)
The computation and communicational model in this framework is defined as a system
of interactive Turing machines (ITM)1. A basic computing element is represented by
an augmented ITM. The augmented ITM (Figure 2.2) consists of three externally
writable tapes to represent information coming from external sources, an outgoing
message tape and a specific extra instruction, as follows:
• Input tape: the tape represents the information coming from a calling program
or an external user.
• Subroutine-output tape: the tape represents the information coming from sub-
routine protocols; programs or modules that are being called by the parent
program.
• Communication tape: this tape represents information coming from other par-
ties of the protocol through communication links.
• Outgoing message tape: the tape represents the information generated by the
machine to be delivered to another machine. The tape holds the outgoing
message together with the addressing information for delivery.
• External write instruction: The effect of this instruction is that it writes the
current written message on the outgoing-message tape of the machine to the
specified writable tape (i.e. input, subrouting-output, or communication) of
the destination machine with the identity mentioned in the outgoing-message
tape. For example, if machine M makes an external-write by writing the tuple
1An interactive Turing machine is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with bidirec-
tional tapes.
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(ID,m, input) on its outgoing-message tape, then the message m will be written
on the input tape of a machine with identity ID.
Input
Subroutine-output
Incoming communication Outgoing message
Identity
Figure 2.2: ITM tapes: an identity that remains unchanged throughout the
computation, an outgoing-message tape for information sent to another machine/outside
world, and three tapes to represent information coming from other machines/outside
world.
Note that the augmented ITM also has a special read-only identity tape with
three values: the description of the program (ITM code); a session identifier (sid)
which represents a specific protocol session; a party identifier (pid) which represents
the party identity within a session. The contents of this tape is used to identify an
instance of an ITM within a system of ITMs ( explained in more detail in the next
section).
2.2.2 Systems of ITMs
The execution of a protocol consists of a system of ITMs which are instantiated and
executed, with multiple instances sharing the same ITM code, and governed by a
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control function. The control function enforces the rules of interaction between ITMs
as required by the execution of the protocol.
An instance of an ITM running a certain program in the network is referred to
as an ITI. We may have multiple instances of an ITM in a protocol execution. To
distinguish between these instances, individual ITIs are parameterized by the program
code of the ITM they instantiate and an identity pair (pid,sid). The ITI’s identity pair
id = (pid,sid) should be unique, regardless of the code it may be running. All ITIs
running with the same code and sid are part of the same protocol session (protocol
instance). The pids are used to distinguish between various ITIs participating in a
protocol session.
2.2.3 The Basic UC Framework
In the basic UC framework, one considers real and ideal protocols. An ideal protocol,
also called ideal functionality, specifies the desired behavior (in particular, security
properties) of the protocol, while the real protocol is the protocol that one wants to
analyze its security. The aim is to show that any adversary A that is attacking the
real protocol pi learns no more information than the adversary, called simulator S,
attacking ideal protocol φ. Moreover, this guarantee needs to hold even in the case
where φ is used as a subroutine in arbitrary other protocols that may be running
concurrently in the networked environment and after replacing φ with pi in all the
instances where it is invoked. In the model, an environment E exists that executes
the attacks and controls the inputs and outputs to the protocol parties. To capture
the aforementioned requirement, the environment E is challenged to distinguish be-
tween the actual attacks performed on the real protocol pi and the simulated attacks
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performed on the ideal protocol φ while freely interacting with the attacker (without
knowing whether it is A or S). The environment E is restricted to execute only a
single instance of the challenge protocol. At the end of execution, if no environment
can distinguish between the real and the ideal world, then protocol pi is said to UC-
emulate the protocol φ. That is, protocol pi satisfies all the security properties that
are specified in protocol φ.
More formally, the following three steps should be done:
1. Real-world: First, the process of the protocol execution is modeled. In this
model, the protocol execution is done in the presence of an adversary A and in a
given computational environment E. The environment E generates the inputs
for the parties and A and also reads parties’ outputs, while the adversary A,
delivers incoming messages to the parties and reads any outgoing messages
generated by the parties.
2. Ideal-world: Next, an ”ideal process” for realizing the given task is formalized.
The ideal process is designed similar to the process of running protocol pi, with
a major difference; the parties do not directly communicate with each other.
In the ideal process, the inputs that are generated by the environment (for
the parties) are given to a trusted party which executes the code of the ideal
functionality F and similarly, the outputs generated by F are handed to the
environment as the parties’ output.
3. Emulation: Finally, the notion of ”protocol emulation” is defined. The proto-
col pi is said to UC-emulate the ideal functionality F if for any adversaryA, there
exists a simulator S such that no environment E can tell, with non-negligible
probability, whether it is interacting with the execution of protocol pi and ad-
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versary A, or alternatively with the ideal process for ideal functionality F and
simulator S.
In order to keep the notion of protocol emulation from being unnecessarily restric-
tive, the framework only considers balanced environments; environments in which the
amount of resources given to the adversary (i.e. the length of the adversary’s input)
is at least some fixed polynomial fraction of the amount of resources given to all
protocols in the system. More precisely:
Definition 1 (Subroutine-respecting protocols; [13]). We say that a protocol pi is
subroutine-respecting if the following properties hold with respect to every instance of
pi in any execution of any protocol ρ that makes subroutine calls to pi:
1. No ITI which is a subsidiary of this instance passes inputs or outputs to an ITI
which is not a party or subsidiary of this instance.
2. At first activation, each ITI that is currently a subsidiary of this instance, or
will ever become one, sends a special message to the adversary, notifying it of
its own code and identity, as well as the code pi and session ID of this instance.
We call this requirement subroutine publicness.
Theorem 1 (UC-Composition; [13]). Let ρ,pi and φ be protocols such that ρ makes
subroutine calls to φ. If pi UC-emulates φ and both pi and φ are subroutine-respecting,
then protocol ρφ⇒pi UC-emulates protocol ρ.
Here ρφ→pi denotes the composed protocol, i.e. protocol ρ where each call to φ is
replaced by a call to pi.
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2.3 Related Work
2.3.1 Security Analysis of Clouds
The OpenStack Security Guide [43] goes into depth about the security of different
aspects of configuring the many different pieces of OpenStack. However, it does
not provide any security analysis, formal or otherwise. Other works [3, 23, 47, 48,
2, 19] have provided informal security analysis of OpenStack (either one service or
the whole platform) and some provided solutions to protect secrecy or integrity of
the VMs against the cloud provider or other VMs running on the same compute
node [46, 61, 62] or privacy and security of the cloud users to protect their data,
code, and computation [10, 12, 50]. However non of the aforementioned works consider
situations where a cloud service is compromised.
Some works have focused on the compromise of compute nodes [57, 56] or parts
of the management infrastructure [49], and Sun et al. [53, 55, 54] specifically dis-
cuss limiting the scope of compromised OpenStack services. These works conclude
that corrupted cloud components have far-reaching security impact and can in many
cases compromise the privacy and integrity of all cloud operations. Their conclusions
highlight the need for a formal security analysis of service corruptions in OpenStack,
which we provide with our analysis. Sze et al. [56] additionally propose an alternative
authorization tokening mechanism to reduce the effect of corrupted compute nodes,
but their construction neither protects against compromise of other services nor pro-
vides token authentication and replay prevention. We have focused on addressing
these requirements as well as shifting control of token generation and scope to the
user responsible for the request (Chapter 5). Also, crucially, we provide a security
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analysis that concretely specifies the security gain.
2.3.2 Using UC
Canetti et al. [14] show how the UC framework can be used to analyze the simple
components of a file system in isolation and to guarantee that these components
maintain their behavior in the larger system even under adversarial conditions. This
demonstrates basic integrity properties of the file system, i.e., the binding of files to
filenames and writing capabilities. Gajek et al. [22] evaluate in the UC framework the
emulation of secure communication sessions by the composition of key exchange func-
tionalities that are realized by the TLS handshake and record layer protocols. Canetti
et al. [16] give a modular and global universally composable analytical framework for
PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols.
For our analysis, we apply the style of [14] to the larger and more complex Open-
Stack framework and utilize aspects of [22, 16] to achieve secure communication. We
further use our construction to demonstrate security flaws in OpenStack’s current
authorization mechanism and assess the improvements provided by our suggested
changes.
2.3.3 Alternative Formalisms
The UC framework is not the only option for formal analysis of computing systems;
there are other frameworks such as pi-calculus [41] and secure pi-calculus [1], com-
municating sequential processes [28], input/output automata [36] etc. that can be
used for modeling distributed systems. In particular, Gu et al. [25] use the Coq
proof assistant to analyze and provide an abstraction of layers of the computing stack
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including the kernel, networking, etc. They developed and verified a certified kernel
with 37 of these abstraction layers.
We chose to use UC Security [13]2 for our analysis because its modularity and
composability aligned well with the structure of OpenStack which is itself composed
of many services that interact via a series of APIs. These services support varying in-
terchangeable implementations that would be difficult to support using a less modular
proof framework.
2.4 Challenges
In order to analyze an OpenStack system, we faced the following challenges:
1- Understand the high-level abstraction of OpenStack: At first glance this
may seem trivial since OpenStack is composed of different components which are
managed by different teams; we had to understand the overall picture of how these
components connect and influence each other for both correctness/functionality and
security. In fact, understanding the security influency is a non-trivial task, because
most teams are expert in only one component. That means, even if the people who
are experts in one component may have limited knowledge about how other teams
use their components, they have no idea how other component’s security threat mod-
els depend upon their own component. In addition, interviewing all these different
teams/experts needs a great amount of time and effort.
OpenStack is an open source project, which means there may be different im-
2Note that there are different universally composable frameworks such as Universally Composable
Security [13], IITM Model [34] and GNUC [29]. The GNUC and IITM models are slight variants of
the Universally Composable Security [13]. We chose to do our analysis using Universally Composable
Security of Canetti [13].
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plementation and plug-ins for the same component. Therefore, one challenge is to
look into different implementations of the same component and understand how do
the implementations differ. Even though this is an implementation detail (that is
typically not part of the specification), we need to know these differences in order to
decide what is the most general functionality(s) for each the component.
2- Define the scope of the project and the adversarial and trust model:
Since this is a large system with various functionalities, we had to make a decision
about what to have as part of our project and what to not have. We decided to
analyze all the components that deal with the main functionalities of a cloud (i.e.
any functionality that is related to a virtual machine) and not to cover the auxiliary
functionalities (e.g. the billing system, Ceilometer). For the adversarial and trust
model, we had to define our ideal functionality’s specification and know what type of
adversary we want to protect against.
3- Define the ideal functionality: One of the most challenging parts of security
analysis using UC framework is the definition of the ideal functionality. At this step,
we need to define the parties, the communication between them, a proper notation
to represent the specification, etc. Since, a) the functionalities in the OpenStack are
much more complicated than the simpler cryptographic functionalities described in
[13], b) the contextualization of the UC modeling toward real-world systems is more
challenging (as explained later), this step was indeed difficult to achieve. In fact, one
lesson to learn is that it is better to first practice the UC modeling with a simpler
system and later on, apply it on the actual large-scale system such as Openstack.
• A point of confusion is what to be considered part of the functionality and what
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to be considered a party. For example, in our case, we first considered all the
plugins and components as individual parties or ideal functionalities. Later, we
realized that whatever we want to consider as a party or functionality depends
on the level of abstraction. In other words, since our aim was to give the highest
level of abstraction, we had to have only a single ideal functionality, called ideal
cloud, and the rest are parties who are communicating with this ideal cloud.
More explicitly, the ideal cloud represents all functionalities of the OpenStack.
Thus the users/environment are considered as parties who communicate with
the ideal cloud and components do not exist in the ideal word.
• Another obstacle we solved was to find a way to distinguish between different
instances and requests. While with basic cryptographic primitives like signature
schemes, where each signature/verification step is its own ’session’ it is easy to
determine when one session should end and the next one should begin, in a
complex system such as OpenStack, it is difficult to decide precisely upon the
scope of a single ’session’, because, a single ’session’ can trigger multiple network
calls to several different services. We defined the session-id to be unique per
each request among different users among different instances by defining it as
the combination of user-id (which is unique) and an incremental counter.
• In an instance of a cloud, there can be many requests operating simultaneously.
Representing this in the specification was a great deal which took a while to be
solved by the notion of ”Upon receiving ...”. With this notion, the cloud will
always wait for an incoming message and according to the message structure
the cloud will execute the correct set of command. In addition, this notion
enables the cloud to get the new incoming requests while other requests are
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being processed.
4- Define the real world: Based on the project scope and the specification/ideal
functionality, the real world will consist of all the components who are needed for
the functionality to be implemented. In a large system like OpenStack, it is almost
impossible to do the realization from the highest level abstraction to the actual im-
plementation. Actually, a proper security analysis includes both the cryptographic
style (i.e UC modeling) and programming language style (i.e. formal verification)
to show that the actual OpenStack code meets the specification. Since the UC def-
inition simultaneously provides correctness and security, applying UC modeling all
the way down to the lowest components implementation would require doing a strict
super-set of the formal verification problem, which is already really hard. For this
reason, we had to make a decision on what to realize. In our case, we decided to
have a hybrid word, a word that is a combination of smaller ideal functionalities and
some actual real implementation. We defined our hybrid world by considering each
component/service as an ideal service while the communication between them to be
as it is in the real world.
Based on the universally composable framework description, for our case, the ideal
functionality, by default, knows the users’ identity. As a result, there is no need to
send the user’s credential with the request to the ideal functionality. However, in the
real world, in order to know if a user has the authorization to make a request, user
credentials should be sent together with the request. Representing this concept was
another challenge to deal with. We added the dashboard as a glue code that uses the
individual ideal services to construct an OpenStack service that looks to an outside
observer like the ideal cloud specification. This code, gets the same input that the
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user/environment provides to the ideal cloud and attaches the user credential to the
request, defines the desired ideal service for the request, reformats the request and
sends it to the proper ideal service.
5- Realization: We have to show that the Hybrid world realizes the ideal cloud.
This step is done by writing the communication steps that are missing in the ideal
cloud through the simulator. In other words, we have to define a simulator which by
getting information (that does not deviate from the security specification) from the
ideal cloud, creates all the intermediate communication messages that are generated
by the component/service in the hybrid world.
Even though we had to go through these five steps to finalize our analysis, the
first, third and fourth steps took approximately 90% of our time.
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Chapter 3
Modeling the Security of
OpenStack: Informal Overview
3.1 Our Approach
We initiate a study of the security properties provided by OpenStack when viewed
as a service to external users which is a typical model for most (large scale) appli-
cations. This includes properties such as confidentiality and integrity of data (both
in storage and in transition), confidentiality and correctness of computations, as well
as timeliness and resource preservation. We also consider the extent to which these
properties are preserved under various attack vectors and when various components
of the system are compromised. We base our analysis in the universally composable
security (UC) framework, which provides a way to articulate security properties in
a rigorous and precise way. According to the definition of universal composability,
a UC-secure component remains secure if it is universally composed with other UC-
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secure components [13]. The extendability property of universal composability allows
us to analyze a part of a system and additively analyze the remaining components.
The framework provides a natural and convenient mechanism for arguing about the
preservation of security when programs and systems are composed in a modular way.
Indeed, from this perspective the UC framework appears to be ideally suited to ana-
lyzing OpenStack whose design is inherently and predominantly modular.
On the other hand, the UC framework was initially created, and predominantly
used, for analyzing cryptographic protocols. These are very different from OpenStack:
while their analysis requires creative reductions to hard computational problems,
they are vastly simpler in terms of number of components, cases, and volume of
code. Indeed, coming up with an effective modeling of OpenStack within the UC
framework is a labor intensive, non-trivial line of research. This work paves the way
in this direction.
Recall that in the UC framework the security requirements from the analyzed
system (or, service) pi are analyzed jointly with the functionality requirements from
the service. This is done by way of formulating an ideal service F, which specifies the
desired response (or lack thereof) to any potential external input. Roughly speaking,
the service pi is said to emulate the ideal service F if no external environment can tell
whether it is interacting with pi or with F.
In order to account for some level of allowable “slack” for pi relative to F, the
framework allows the analyst to introduce an intermediary, or a simulator S that
controls some of the interfaces between F and the environment. That is, service pi
is now said to emulate an ideal service F if there exists a simulator S such that no
external environment can tell whether it is interacting with pi or with a system where
some of its APIs connect to F, and other APIs connect to S. (Typically, S connects
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to APIs that we don’t consider to be part of the desired functionality, such as the
communication between components of the implementing protocol.)
An attractive property of this definitional style is the following natural security-
preserving composability: Since the specification F is written as an “idealized” service
in and of itself, one can design and analyze some other system (or, service) ρ where
the components of ρ make calls to one or more instances of the service F. The UC
framework guarantees that the protocol ρF→pi, where each instance of F is replaced
by an instance of pi, continues to exhibit the same security and correctness properties
as the original protocol ρ. In particular, if ρ emulates some other ideal service G, then
ρF→pi will emulate G just the same. (Note that both pi and ρ may well be distributed,
multi-component systems in and of themselves.)
Our goal is to demonstrate an approach that enables analysts to analyze the
security of OpenStack in a structured and perceptible manner. To do so, in this
chapter, we provide initial modeling and analysis of the overall design and operation
of OpenStack, as well as the functionality and security requirements from a number
of core modules. Our analysis validates the overall security of the design, while at
the same time formulating some security weaknesses. Although, the weaknesses are
conceptually known to the OpenStack community, our analysis shows the right level
at which these issues must be dealt. For example, Sze et al. [56] tried to solve the
token problem by assuming a trusted component inside Nova. Our analysis shows
that such designs are not a suitable design decision if we are looking for a UC-
secure system. We also propose and analyze methods for properly overcoming these
weaknesses (Chapter 5).
We stress that our analysis only covers the high level design of some main compo-
nents of OpenStack. A detailed analysis of vulnerabilities within such a huge system
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are not the focus of this dissertation; nevertheless, our work does pave the way for
future work to model and analyze additional components, or to analyze the structure
and security of individual components in more detail.
We first formulate an ideal cloud FCloud that provides a simple specification of
the functionality and security that we assert OpenStack achieves. This formulation
naturally involves many design choices and parameters that affect the security and
functionality requirements imposed on the system. We discuss them within. One
important aspect of our ideal cloud specification is the expected behavior upon various
types of partial corruption (which correspond to corruption of individual modules in
an OpenStack service). This is where we depart from the current OpenStack package,
which does not provide any security guarantees as soon as any module is corrupted.
Next we formulate ideal functionalities that correspond to the four services we
capture, namely FCompute, FImage, FBlockStorage, and FIdentity. Our models for each
OpenStack service aim at capturing the functionality and intricacies of the actual
components of OpenStack, modulo some necessary modifications that are essential
for security (discussed in section 3.2.3). Also here we face a number of choices that
represent different levels of security of these services.
These services communicate with each other via secure message transmission
FSMT. Additionally, they use an external network FExtNet to communicate with the
user, or more specifically to connect to the user’s Dashboard program (which is our
abstraction of Horizon). Collectively, the joint interactive effort of these services and
protocols comprise a cloud of OpenStack Services. In the two main results of our work
(Theorems 2 and 3), we prove that the OpenStack services collectively UC-realize our
ideal cloud.
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3.2 Modeling OpenStack Services
In this section, we provide an informal account of our modeling of OpenStack and the
security guarantees we assert. We first describe the behavior of each service and the
risk associated with its compromise. Then, we generalize from the service-level issues
to provide informal, holistic security properties about OpenStack as a whole. Finally,
we survey the design decisions and degrees of freedom that influence our model. The
informal account in this section is then followed by the actual definitions of the ideal
cloud (Section 3.3) and the OpenStack services (Section 3.4).
Following the approach of the UC framework, we consider an adversarial envi-
ronment E that controls all the interfaces of the legitimate users with the analyzed
service, and in addition controls the communication network and the compromised
components of the system.
In the context of our OpenStack service, this means that E can create new compute
nodes with specific images of its choice, and link nodes to storage volumes subject to
their capabilities. In addition, E can delay or drop arbitrary traffic on the external
network (e.g., the Internet) over which users communicate with OpenStack. Next, E
can compromise one or more OpenStack services, and thus we reinforce the services to
provide defense-in-depth against service-level compromise. We consider both passive
corruptions in which the compromised services continue to function normally but
only leak their internal states to E, and complete corruptions where the compromized
services start running code provided by E.
It is stressed that, while the modeling and analysis considers only the interaction
between E and a single instance of our cloud service, the universal composition the-
orem guarantees that the same security guarantees continue to hold even when E is
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interacting concurrently with other instances of our system and with arbitrary other
systems.
3.2.1 Functionality and Security of Each Service
We begin by describing several functionalities that encapsulate both the functionality
and security relationships between the OpenStack services and the user’s dashboard
protocol. In particular, we model the following functionalities in this work:
Dashboard Unlike the services described below, the Dashboard protocol is
owned and operated by a single user. The Dashboard specifies the sequence of service
requests needed to satisfy the user’s desires.
Compromising either the Dashboard or the user directly gives E the user’s cre-
dentials. Hence, E can execute any operation that the user has privileges to perform,
but cannot otherwise tamper with the services in any way; in particular, users never
learn each other’s credentials.
Identity FIdentity is responsible for managing credentials. It communicates with
all users and services. We presume that FIdentity is instantiated with credentials for
each user and service; in practice, these credentials correspond to bearer tokens that
can be acquired via an authentication protocol involving a username/password. Sub-
sequently, when any service FService receives a request, it may ask FIdentity to validate
whether the request is authorized based upon the credentials provided. Addition-
ally, note that while OpenStack uses a project/role based permissions system, our
modeling is agnostic to the design of credentials.
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When E compromises FIdentity, E essentially has full control of OpenStack. It
immediately acquires the credentials of all users and can even change the permissions
associated with them. Furthermore, because all services outsource their authorization
decisions to FIdentity, E can make any request and convince all services to execute it.
Compute FCompute is responsible for managing the computing nodes on the
cloud. It expects that the commands it receives over the network originate with the
user’s dashboard service. Then, it relies upon the other OpenStack services to aid
in fulfilling these requests. In more detail, FCompute accepts commands from users to
create, access, or delete computing nodes. In response, it may request images from
FImage, connect to volumes stored on FBlockStorage.
Compromising FCompute gives the environment extensive power: it may create or
delete arbitrary nodes from FCompute’s records and may also capture the credentials
of any user who subsequently accesses the service and use these credentials to falsify
requests to other services.
Image FImage stores virtual machine images that can be used when instantiating
new nodes. These images may either be publicly accessible, or restricted only to users
in the appropriate project. It only provides one method that FCompute may invoke
to request an image. FImage will respond as long as credentials with appropriate
permissions are provided.
Compromising FImage allows the environment to learn both the images stored on
the service as well as all user credentials that pass through it. However, a compro-
mised FImage cannot directly influence other services since they never expect incoming
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connections directly from FImage.
Node FNode is our abstraction of a virtual machine; it can execute arbitrary
programs on behalf of the project that owns it. Nodes are spawned by FCompute but
then act independently. Because FCompute sends the code of a node over the network
when it is instantiated, E may view the initial code.
Compromising FNode gives the environment the ability to view all executing codes
and to maul the computation performed within the node.
Storage and volumes FBlockStorage manages the collection of data volumes avail-
able for use by users. It provisions volumes and attaches them to nodes, but then is
out of the loop during subsequent data accesses.
Compromising FBlockStorage permits the environment to attach and detach volumes
from nodes of her choice. As a countermeasure to protect the data from unauthorized
disclosure, the volume can be encrypted with a key that is only known to users with
the correct project permissions.
Message bus OpenStack has an internal message queue to handle communi-
cation between services. It allows us to optionally enable TLS for the inter-service
communication. We model the TLS-enabled message bus using a secure message
transmission functionality FSMT that protects the integrity of messages; additionally,
it protects the confidentiality of tokens. This is a deviation from OpenStack as-is,
which would allow any compromised service to breach message integrity and token
confidentiality [3].
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External communication between services and users (or their Dashboards) is han-
dled instead by FExtNet, which provides data confidentiality but does not authenticate
the message’s sender. This modeling decision reflects the fact that OpenStack never
verifies whether the user sending the message is actually the owner of the credentials
contained therein.
3.2.2 Security Assertions
We list below several security guarantees. We stress that this is an informal descrip-
tion of forbidden or ‘blacklisted’ activities; the UC modeling in Sections 3.4 and 3.3
specifies exactly the set of permissible activities in a ‘whitelist’ format.
A main ingredient in our modeling and analysis is the behavior of the ideal cloud
upon corruption of individual services. This way, we capture the compromises we
consider and the security properties we guarantee in face of compromise.
Authentication & authorization As long as FIdentity is uncompromised, E is
limited to perform only those actions authorized by her projects and roles. Corrupt
services can perform actions within their scope on behalf of the environment, but
cannot influence uncorrupted services to perform unauthorized actions.
User control By moving away from bearer tokens, we can provide some user
control even in the face of service-level compromises. Bearer tokens allow a corrupted
service to impersonate a user to other, uncorrupted services and perform unintended
actions. See Chapter 5 for details on our new tokening mechanism that removes the
ability to replay user tokens and thus reduces the scope of a corrupted service to only
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those actions the service is able to perform directly. As FNode does not have access
to user tokens, a corrupted FNode is unable to make changes affecting the OpenStack
control or data plane. In this sense we model FNode as being fully isolated from other
FNode instances or OpenStack services. Future expansion of our FCompute model could
include a hypervisor-like functionality detailing this isolation of FNode.
Resource control Users may restrict the environment from accessing and tam-
pering with computing nodes, data volumes, and images as long as two services re-
main uncompromised: FIdentity and the service managing the object. Put simply, the
services properly separate their control and data planes. For example, a corrupted
compute can delete arbitrary user nodes, but it cannot influence the data stored on
unattached volumes or the actions of other nodes (e.g., request a new image from the
image service) without user authorization. This guarantee holds only if E does not
legitimately hold the required project/role permissions.
Note that all of the guarantees described above only apply at the OpenStack
layer. For instance: if you use OpenStack to spawn a web server with several known
vulnerabilities and then connect it to the Internet, it is certainly possible for E to
compromise your node. We make no guarantees about the safety of objects stored
within OpenStack, only about their management by OpenStack.
Additionally, enforcing these security guarantees may come at the expense of
flexibility. Having all security at the border and full trust within OpenStack makes it
easier to realize the cloud vision of fungibility; for instance, if one node fails then any
worker can be tasked automatically to take over for it. By chaining all authorization
decisions back to the user, we reduce the cloud’s ability to self-regulate load balancing,
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scaling, and failover decisions.
3.2.3 Modeling Decisions
In this section, we discuss some of the decisions that impacted our modeling. First,
we needed to decide the scope of FCompute within Nova, the largest OpenStack service.
At a high level, Nova comprises both the front-end API/scheduler and the back-end
worker nodes. We choose to be more fine-grained so that our model is capable of
describing the effects of compromising part, but not all of the (large) Nova code-base.
This decision is made without loss of generality; compromising the entire Nova service
corresponds in our mode to corrupting FCompute and all FNode functionalities.
Second, we augment FIdentity in Chapter 5 to strengthen tokens so they aren’t
susceptible to data spills. Third, FSMT assumes that services register keys with the
message queue so that it can enforce data integrity and token confidentiality in transit
on the internal network.
3.3 The Ideal Cloud
Our ideal cloud functionality is a UC functionality that provides the user with the
following set of commands:
CreateNode Allows a user to create a new node.
DeleteNode Allows a user to delete a node that they had previously created.
AccessNode Allows a user to execute a command on one of their nodes.
AttachVolume Allows a user to attach one of their volumes to an existing node.
DetachVolume Allows a user to detach a volume that had been attached to one
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Algorithm 1 Simplified Ideal Cloud (See Algorithm 8 for the detailed version)
1: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Delete Node”, session-id, node-id) from E: . Step 1
2: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id); . Step 2
3:
4: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from S: . Step 3
5: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) then
6: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to delete node node-id then
7: Valid= True;
8: else
9: Valid= False;
10: end if
11: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid); .
Step 4
12: end if
13: Upon receiving (”Delete Node”, session-id, Continue) from S: . Step 5
14: NodeExist = False;
15: if there is node with id=node-id & Valid= True then
16: NodeExist = True;
17: Delete node-id from the Node list;
18: end if
19: Send-Sim (”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, Valid, NodeExist); . Step 6
20:
21: Upon receiving (”Output Delete Node”, session-id) from S: . Step 7
22: if NodeExist= False or Valid= False then
23: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail) to E; . Step 8
24: else
25: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Success) to E; . Step 8
26: end if
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of their nodes.
It is, in a sense, the simplest specification that is faithful in both functionality
and security to the real services. As with all UC functionalities, the simplicity of the
ideal cloud is intended to promote understanding and transparency of OpenStack’s
behavior. Here, we exemplify a simplified version of ideal cloud functionality FCloud
for the Delete Node function in Algorithm 1. (The full version of this algorithm,
which includes message buffering, is written in Algorithm 8.) Our formulation of
FCloud is simple: FCloud asks the permission of the simulator S for receiving every
Delete Node request, and also its permission for sending each notification back to the
environment. Also, FCloud does not hide the user credential validity information and
the node existence information, as the adversary may discover the information from
the execution of requests.
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Figure 3.1: Delete Node in Ideal Cloud with the Simulator.
The information sent from the ideal cloud to the ideal-model adversary (i.e., to the
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simulator) represents the information that’s allowed to be leaked. Specifically, we hide
the user and service credentials from the adversary, but leak all other information. We
show that, even with this advantage, the ideal cloud guarantees that the adversary
cannot impersonate a user and make requests on their behalf without compromising
the user or services.
The ideal cloud also captures the security guarantees that are still provided in
case some of the services get corrupted. In particular, the ideal cloud specifies the
allowed degradation in security when a particular service is corrupted. (Notice that
in the context of the ideal cloud the various services are merely names, or tags for
the corruption operation made by the adversary.)
3.3.1 Ideal Cloud Walkthrough
In the ideal cloud setting, since we model the cloud as a single entity, there is no inter-
nal communication and it is left to the simulator to provide the necessary interaction
with the environment. The DeleteNode request begins at Step 1 (Fig. 3.1) when the
environment sends a Delete Node message to the ideal cloud, through a dummy user
who simply forwards inputs. The ideal cloud, could simply, check that the indicated
user had the correct permissions to delete the requested node and, if so, removes it
from the list of active nodes. However, to capture the fact that the system leaks the
user request, the ideal cloud sends the user request to the simulator ( Step 2).
When the cloud receives the confirmation message from S in Step 3 it verifies that
the user has permission to delete it and relays this information to the simulator in
Step 4. In Step 5, the simulator tells the cloud to continue. The cloud will then check
whether the node exists and if so, removes the node from the list of active nodes and
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notifies S in step 6. By receiving the continue message from S (step 7), the cloud
outputs the success message to the environment through the dummy user in Step 8.
3.3.2 Ideal Cloud Security Guarantees
In the ideal cloud setting, there is no need for credentials; the ideal cloud is able
to check whether the user has the permission for its request or not. That is, the
environment simply sends a delete request with the required parameters without the
need to know the user credential. On the other hand, when the ideal cloud sends the
delete request to S, the S will never know the credential value (which we are aiming
to protect). This means the confidentiality of the data transfer is guaranteed. In
addition, the ideal cloud will store the intermediate steps information in its buffer to
provide data integrity. For data storage, since all the required data are stored in ideal
cloud database, the integrity and confidentiality of data storage is also provided.
3.3.3 Accounting for Existing Weaknesses
In the case of having compromised services, in order to UC-emulate OpenStack Ser-
vices, we had to weaken the security guarantees of the ideal cloud and change the
behavior of the simulator. That is, if a service (say, the Nova compute service) has
been compromised, the ideal cloud FCloud sends S a list of user-ids that have been
compromised when compute is corrupted; for each such user-id, the simulator creates
a ‘dummy’ credential for use in all messages it generates. Additionally, we observe
that the environment can send any message on behalf of the corrupted compute; since
the simulator cannot directly answer any requests that the environment might make
to another (uncompromised) service, S must forward such requests to FCloud and get a
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response through its specific interface. For example, when Nova is compromised, the
adversary is able to send a request to Glance (image service) using user’s credential to
get an image. This means that the simulator should be able to provide the requested
image to the environment. The simulator does not have the image, therefore it need
to ask the ideal cloud. However, the ideal cloud does not respond to this type of
simulator’s requests. In order to realize the OpenStack Services, we had to remove
some of ideal cloud security check points, which decreases the security guarantees.
That is, for this example, when the simulator sends a request to get the image (for a
corrupted user) while the user has not requested a node to be created, the ideal cloud
does not check whether the user has made a ”create node” request or not and instead
will simply respond to the simulator. Finally, we observe that the bearer token is an
unscoped multi-use token, so the environment can make multiple requests on behalf
of each compromised user or send the same request multiple times to another service.
Fortunately, the two tactics described above (creating dummy user-id credentials and
forwarding service-to-service requests to FCloud) are both designed also to succeed for
multiple invocations. The OpenStack security imperfections discussed in the intro-
duction under the subtitle Security weaknesses formalized are the principal reasons
for decreasing the security guarantees.
In order to understand why these weaknesses come into place, in the next section,
we look into how real services work. We will also explore one of these weaknesses (the
token mechanism) in more detail and see how an improved version yields a stronger
ideal cloud (Chapter 5).
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3.4 OpenStack Services
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Figure 3.2: OpenStack Services: Arrows indicated expected lines of communication;
other communication flow is possible, but will be ignored. Gray arrows show
communication with the adversary, dashed black arrows indicate communication through
FSMT, and solid black arrows indicate a direct communication.
In this section we describe our model of a simplified OpenStack cloud. The service
functionalities, in conjunction with the message passing functionalities, collectively
provide the same set of possible commands as the ideal cloud in the previous section.
We require both that the services maintain the confidentiality of users’ credentials
while executing the commands and enforce that only a user in possession of the
required credentials will be able to execute a command.
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3.4.1 Example Workflow
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Figure 3.3: The Delete node functionality starts when the environment sends a
”DeleteNode” message to the user. Next the user adds its credentials and sends it to the
FCompute. Then, FCompute creates a validation request to FIdentity in order to validate
user’s credentials. Based on the validation result and the node existence, FCompute deletes
the node and notifies the user. We describe the workflow in detail in Section 3.4.1.
We will walk through an example of how a user would delete its node using
these service functionalities and a dashboard protocol. This example will show the
interaction between the FCompute and FIdentity services and the user. We note that all
messages between services will pass through FSMT while any messages between the
user and services will go through FExtNet. We will briefly mention this during the
description and it can be seen in Fig. 3.3 as well.
This interaction begins at Step 1 (Fig. 3.3, Algorithm 2) when the environment
sends a DeleteNode message of the form (”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id) to the
user. The user will then reformat this message in Step 2 to include their credentials
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and send it to FExtNet to be forwarded to FCompute. When FExtNet (Algorithm 3)
receives the message it removes the user’s credentials and leaks the rest of the message
to the adversary in Step 3. After receiving a (Confirm, session-id) message from the
adversary in Step 4, FExtNet sends the original message on to FCompute. In Step 5,
(Algorithm 4) FCompute receives the message from the user and creates a request of
the form (FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, credscompute, creds, ”Delete node-
id ”) to FIdentity via FSMT in Step 6 (Algorithm 5). The message passing by FSMT will
proceed as in Steps 3-4. After FIdentity receives the validation message from FCompute in
Step 9 (Algorithm 6) it will check that the user has permission to delete the requested
node and send an appropriate response to FCompute, again via FSMT, in Step 10. Once
FCompute receives the validation message from FIdentity in Step 13, it will delete the
requested node if the node exists and the validation was successful, otherwise it will
note that the request failed. In Step 14, FCompute will send a message to the user,
proceeding as before through FExtNet, notifying them of the result of their request —
either the successful deletion of the node or its failure. The user, upon receiving this
message in Step 17 will output the result to the environment in the final step.
3.4.2 Realization of This Workflow
We write specifications for our functionalities in pseudocode with relevant snippets
for the DeleteNode workflow shown in simplified Algorithms 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
We allow the adversary to compromise users or services (Algorithms 7 shows cor-
rupted Compute). A compromised user or service will reveal all of its internal state
to the adversary and will from that point on be under full adversarial control. In
particular, compromised users and services will not necessarily follow any specified
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Algorithm 2 Dashboard Example Workflow
1: Upon receiving Request-Message from E:
2: User U Creates (UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds);
3: Send-FExtNet(UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds); . Step 2
4:
5: Upon receiving (Sender, Output-Message) from FExtNet: . Step 17
6: Output (Output-Message) to E; . Step 18
Algorithm 3 External Network Example Workflow
1: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver, Message): . Step 2
2: Create New-Message by removing the credentials and replacing them by their
IDs;
3: Send-Adversary(Sender, Receiver, New-Message); . Step 3
4:
5: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from Adversary: . Step 4
6: Send-Receiver(Sender, Message); . Step 5
Algorithm 4 Compute Example Workflow
1: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, creds) from FExtNet:
. Step 5
2: Send-FSMT (FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, credscompute, creds,
”Delete node-id ”); . Step 6
3:
4: Upon receiving (FIdentity, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id, Re-
quest, valid) from FSMT: . Step
13
5: Result= Fail;
6: if valid & a node with id=node-id exists then
7: Delete node with id=node-id;
8: Result= Successful;
9: end if
10: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Result); .
Step 14
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Algorithm 5 SMT Example Workflow
1: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver,Message): . Steps 6, 10
2: Create New-Message by removing the credentials and replacing them by their
IDs;
3: Send-Adversary(Sender, Receiver, New-Message); . Steps 7,11
4:
5: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from Adversary: . Steps 8, 12
6: Send-Receiver(Sender, Message); . Steps 13, 9
Algorithm 6 Identity Example Workflow
1: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, credsservice, creds, Re-
quest) from FSMT: . Step
9
2: valid=False;
3: if credsservice & creds are valid & creds is allowed to perform the Request then
4: valid=True;
5: end if
6: Send-FSMT (FIdentity, Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id,
Request, valid); . Step 10
Algorithm 7 Corrupted Compute
1: function ReceiveMessage
2: Upon receiving (Source, message) from FSMT \FExtNet:
3: Send-FSMT (source, Adversary, message);
4: end function
5:
6: function SendMessage
7: Upon receiving (Adversary, ”Forward”, message, destination) from FSMT:
8: Send-FSMT (FCompute, destination, message);
9: end function
10:
11: function Main
12: Upon receiving a message which does not contain “Forward” &
Source=Adversary from FSMT:
13: Apply the request;
14: Send-FSMT (FCompute, Adversary, result of the request);
15: end function
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protocol and can form their own messages at will. This is particularly relevant in
our case because, upon compromising a service the adversary will learn not only its
credentials, which are part of the internal state of the service, but also any creden-
tials that service learns in the future. That is, any user that makes a request to a
compromised service will also leak its own credentials to the adversary.
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Chapter 4
Basic Security of OpenStack
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the security of OpenStack in the universal
composability setting, specially, we want to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The OpenStack Services protocol from §3.4 UC-realizes the Ideal Cloud
FCloud from §3.3 in the (FExtNet, FSMT)-hybrid model.
In order to prove this theorem, we need to:
• formally specifiy the ideal cloud and OpenStack Service in UC syntax
• provide a simulator and
• analyze that the simulator works to insure that the views of the environment is
the same in both worlds.
The remaining sections of this chapter are exactly to cover these purposes. Here,
we define the terminologies that have been used in the rest of this thesis.
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• session-id: A unique value which is a concatenation of user identity U and
an incremental number. The uniqueness of the session-id is evaluated in each
functionality before sending to the request-message.
• Buffer: In order to be able to track a request, components needs to store the
request’s information. Buffer is the place where the request’s information is
stored, updated, fetched or removed whenever needed.
• confirmation message: Represents the adversarial interruption. The adversary
may:
– Permit the packet to be sent to the destination by sending a confirmation
message for that session,
– Delay the packet by sending the confirmation message with delay, or
– Drop the packet by not sending the confirmation message at all.
4.1 Ideal Cloud Functionality Using Bearer To-
kens
Algorithm 8 represents FCloud; the ideal cloud using bearer tokens with/without ser-
vice corruption. FCloud stores information related to corrupted services (note that in
this case, the services are only names for the corruption operation that is done by the
adversary) to be able to respond to the ideal-model adversary (i.e., to the simulator)
in the case of corruption. Since the ideal cloud is a monolithic functionality, in the
case on compromises it behave as if different components (services), such as Compute
or Storage, have been corrupted despite not being composed of distinct parts. This
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is done by adding special interfaces to the ideal cloud (explained in Table 4.1) which
allows the simulator to make further requests in the case of corruption. Additionally,
if a portion of the cloud is corrupted it may cease to perform validation checks for its
requests.
Algorithm 8 Ideal Cloud with corrupted services for bearer token
1: function Cloud
2: Upon receiving (”Corrupt”, Service, value) from Sim:
3: Corrupt[Service]=value; % the default value=None. None indicates no cor-
ruption; Passive is the partial corruption, and Active is the full corruption
4: if Service=FImage & value!=None then
5: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
6: Add (user-id) to the List;
7: end if
8: send-Sim(DB of (image-id, corresponding-Image),List of (user-id));
9: else if Service=FCompute & value!=None then
10: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
11: Add (user-id) to the List;
12: Send-Sim(List of (user-id));
13: end if
14: else if Service=FIdentity & value!=None then
15: Send-Sim(DB of (user-id, roles));
16: else if Service=FBlockStorage & value!=None then
17: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
18: Add (user-id) to the List;
19: end if
20: Send-Sim(List of (user-id));
21: else if Service=FNodenode-id & value!=None then
22: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
23: Add (user-id) to the List;
24: end if
25: Send-Sim(List of (user-id));
26: else if Service=FVolumevolume-id & value!=None then
27: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
28: Add (user-id) to the List;
29: end if
30: Send-Sim(List of (user-id));
31: end if
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32: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity) from user U:
33: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
34: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity);
35: end if
36: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, RequestAc-
tivity);
37:
38:
39: Upon receiving(”Result Access Node”, session-id) from Sim:
40: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity, valid) then
41: if valid=True then
42: results ← Execute(AccessRequest);
43: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
RequestActivity, valid}, {Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
result, valid});
44: Send-Sim (”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, result, valid);
45: end if
46: end if
47: Upon receiving(”Output Access Node”, session-id) from Sim:
48: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, results,
valid) then
49: Valid=valid;
50: RemoveBuffer(”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, results, valid);
51: Output(”Access Node”, session-id, results, Valid) to Receiver ;
52: end if
53:
54: Upon receiving (”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity) from
Sim:
55: if Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
56: results ← Execute(AccessRequest);
57: else
58: results = None
59: end if
60: Send-Sim(”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity, results)
61: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) from user U;
62: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
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63: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id);
64: end if
65: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
66:
67: Upon receiving (”Result Attach Volume”, session-id) from Sim:
68: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id, valid) then
69: if valid=True & attached-volume for node node-id is None & attached-
node for volume volume-id is None then
70: Set attached-volume for node node-id to volume-id
71: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to node-id
72: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-
id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Successful })
73: Send-Sim(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, Successful)
74: else
75: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-
id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail) })
76: Send-Sim(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, Fail)
77: end if
78: end if
79:
80: Upon receiving (”Output Attach Volume”, session-id) from Sim:
81: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id, Successful) then
82: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Successful)
83: Output(”Attach Volume”, session-id, Successful) to Receiver
84: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail) then
85: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail)
86: Output(”Attach Volume”, session-id, Fail) to Receiver
87: end if
88:
89: Upon Receiving (Confirm, ”Attach Volume” session-id, valid)
90: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
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91: if user user-id is allowed to attach volume-id to node-id then
92: valid=True
93: else
94: valid=False
95: end if
96: if Corrupt[Identity]=Active then
97: valid = value sent by Sim
98: end if
99: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid })
100: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid)
101: end if
102:
103: Upon receiving (”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id) from Sim;
104: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
105: Set attached-volume for node node-id to volume-id
106: end if
107: if Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active” then
108: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to node-id
109: end if
110: Send-Sim (”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
111: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) from user U;
112: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
113: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id);
114: end if
115: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
116:
117: Upon receiving (”Result Detach Volume”, session-id) from Sim:
118: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, valid) then
119: if valid=True & attached-volume for node node-id is volume-id &
attached-node for volume volume-id is node-id then
120: Set attached-volume for node node-id to None
121: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to None
122: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id,
volume-id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id,
volume-id, node-id, Successful })
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123: Send-Sim(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, Success-
ful)
124: else
125: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id,
volume-id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id,
volume-id, node-id, Fail) })
126: Send-Sim(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, Fail)
127: end if
128: end if
129:
130: Upon receiving (”Output Detach Volume”, session-id) from Sim:
131: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Successful) then
132: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Successful)
133: Output(”Detach Volume”, session-id, Successful) to Receiver
134: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail) then
135: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail)
136: Output(”Detach Volume”, session-id, Fail) to Receiver
137: end if
138: Upon Receiving (Confirm, ”Detach Volume” session-id, valid)
139: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) then
140: if user user-id is allowed to detach volume-id from node-id then
141: valid=True
142: else
143: valid=False
144: end if
145: if Corrupt[Identity]=Active then
146: valid = value sent by Sim
147: end if
148: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id }, {Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid })
149: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid)
150: end if
151:
152: Upon receiving (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id) from Sim;
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153: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
154: Set attached-volume for node node-id to None
155: end if
156: if Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active” then
157: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to None
158: end if
159: Send-Sim (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
160: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure) from U:
161: if Corrupt[Compute]!=”Active” then
162: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
163: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure);
164: end if
165: end if
166: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure);
167:
168: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output”, session-id) from Sim:
169: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, node-id, valid)
then
170: Output(”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
171: end if
172:
173: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, user-id) from
user U:
174: if Corrupt[Compute]!=”Active” then
175: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
176: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
177: end if
178: end if
179: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
180:
181: Upon receiving (”Output Delete Node”, session-id) from Sim:
182: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid,
NodeExist) then
183: if NodeExist=False or Valid=False then
184: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail) to Receiver ;
185: else
186: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Successful) to Receiver ;
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187: end if
188: end if
189: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from Sim:
190: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure) then
191: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to create node using Node-Structure
then
192: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
193: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Node-Structure})
194: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”);
195: else
196: if user-id is allowed to create node with image-id with Node-
Structure & there exists image-id then
197: Corresponding-Image=get the image corresponding to image-
id;
198: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image});
199: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure);
200: else
201: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id,
NULL, Fail});
202: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail,
reason=”Get Image”, Node-Structure);
203: end if
204: end if
205: else
206: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, NULL, Fail});
207: Send-Sim(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Create Node”, Node-Structure);
208: end if
209: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) then
210: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to delete node node-id then
211: Valid=True;
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212: else
213: Valid=False;
214: end if
215: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id
},{Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid});
216: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid);
217: end if
218:
219:
220: Upon receiving (”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, Request) from Sim:
221: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Image]=”Active” or Cor-
rupt[Storage]=”Active” then
222: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to apply Request then
223: valid=True;
224: else
225: valid=False;
226: end if
227: Send-Sim(”validation”, user-id, session-id, Request, valid);
228: end if
229:
230: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) from
Sim:
231: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
232: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
233: end if
234:
235: Upon receiving (”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) from Sim:
236: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”,
session-id, user-id, node-id) then
237: if valid=True then
238: if node node-id exists then
239: NodeExist=True;
240: Delete node with node-id;
241: else
242: NodeExist=False
243: end if
244: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
245: Send-Sim (Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist);
246: end if
247: end if
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248: Upon receiving (”MainComputeCorrupt”, request) from Sim:
249: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” and the request is either ”CreateNode” or
”DeleteNode” or ”AttachVolume” or ”DetachVolume” or ”AccessNode”) then
250: Apply the request;
251: Send-Sim (MainComputeCorruptResult, result);
252: end if
253:
254: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node result”, session-id, node-id, valid)
from Sim:
255: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
256: Output (”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
257: end if
258:
259: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image, node-id) from Sim:
260: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-
id, user-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Node-Structure) then
261: if node-id is not used then
262: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Node-Structure}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Successful});
263: Add (node-id, user-id, Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure) to the
list of active nodes;
264: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, successful);
265: else
266: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure,, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Fail});
267: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Fail);
268: end if
269: end if
270:
271: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id) from Sim:
272: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
273: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to apply Request then
274: valid=True;
275: if image image-id exists then
276: Corresponding-Image= extract corresponding image of image-id;
277: else
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278: Corresponding-Image=NULL;
279: end if
280: else
281: valid=False;
282: Corresponding-Image=NULL;
283: end if
284: Send-Sim(”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Corresponding-
Image, valid);
285: end if
286:
287: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, image-id) from Sim:
288: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
289: if image image-id exists then
290: Corresponding-Image= extract corresponding image of image-id;
291: else
292: Corresponding-Image=NULL;
293: end if
294: Send-Sim(”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image);
295: end if
296:
297: Upon receiving (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id, Corresponding-Image) from
Sim:
298: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
299:
300: if node-id is not used then
301: Add( node-id, user-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image) to the
list of active nodes;
302: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue, session-id, node-id, Success-
ful});
303: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Successful);
304: else
305: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue, session-id, node-id, Fail});
306: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Fail);
307: end if
308: end if
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309: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output valid”, session-id, valid) from Sim:
310: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
311: if valid=False then
312: Output(”Create Node”, session-id, NULL, Fail) to Receiver ;
313: end if
314: end if
315: Upon receiving (”Delete Node”, session-id, Continue) from Sim:
316: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid)
then
317: if there is node with node-id then
318: NodeExist=True;
319: else
320: NodeExist=False;
321: end if
322: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
Valid}, {Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid, NodeEx-
ist});
323: if Valid=True & NodeExist=True then
324: Delete node-id from the Node list;
325: end if
326: Send-Sim (”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, Valid, NodeExist);
327: end if
328:
329: Upon receiving (”Output Delete Node”, session-id) from Sim:
330: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid,
NodeExist) then
331: if NodeExist=False or Valid=False then
332: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail) to Receiver ;
333: else
334: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Successful) to Receiver ;
335: end if
336: end if
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337: Upon receiving (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id) from Sim:
338: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Corresponding-Image) then
339: node-struct=Node-Structure;
340: if node-id is not used then
341: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Successful});
342: Add (node-id, user-id, Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure) to the
list of active nodes;
343: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, successful);
344: else
345: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure,, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Fail});
346: Send-Sim(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Fail);
347: end if
348: end if
349:
350: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output”, session-id) from Sim:
351: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, node-id, valid)
then
352: Output(”Create Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
353: end if
354: end function
Table 4.1 explains different interfaces we added to FCloud in order to preserve the
indistinguishably between the ideal world and the OpenStack Services world.
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Table 4.1: Added interfaces to the ideal cloud for corrupted services in Algorithm 8
Code Line Description
54-57 For corrupted node, if the adversary asked for execution, then the
ideal cloud will execut the given activity.
96-97 For corrupted identity, adversary is able to change the validation
result.
103-110 For corrupted compute or node, the adversary may provide arbitrary
node-id to detach a volume from it. For corrupted storage or volume,
the adversary may provide arbitrary volume-id to detach a node from
it.
145-147 For corrupted identity, the adversary may provide arbitrary valida-
tion result for the case of detach volume.
220-228 Represents the interface for the situation that a corrupted service
(any service except identity) makes a validation request to identity.
In the normal situation (no corruption), the ideal cloud will never
respond to this type of requests, however, with corruption, the ideal
cloud provides respond.
230-233 For corrupted compute, the ideal cloud outputs a delete node result
if adversary asks to.
235-246 For corrupted identity, when a user makes a delete node request,
the ideal cloud should not do the valuation for the user and only
needs to check if the node exists, the validation is provided by the
adversary.
247-251 For corrupted compute, the ideal cloud will apply any request which
this service can handle, without any validation check.
254-257 For corrupted compute, the ideal cloud outputs a create node result
if adversary asks to.
259-269 For corrupted image, the ideal cloud creates a node with image pro-
vided by the adversary in the case of a create node request from a
user.
271-285 For corrupted compute, the adversary is able to make a request to
image service to get an image with specific image-id.
287-295 For corrupted identity and a request for the image with a specific
image-id is made.
297-308 For corrupted identity, if the adversary set validation result to True
for a create node request, then the ideal cloud will create that node.
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4.2 OpenStack Services Functionalities Using Bearer
Token
User Dashboard
Environment
FCompute FStorageFImage FIdentity
API
FExternalNetwork
FSMT
Adversary
Figure 4.1: OpenStack Services Functionalities. Arrows indicated expected lines of
communication; other communication flow is possible, but will be ignored. Solid black
arrows indicate direct communication, dashed black arrows show communication with the
adversary, gray arrows indicate communication through FExtNet, dashed gray arrows
indicate communication through FSMT.
In this section different OpenStack Service functionalities are explained. Figure 4.1
illustrates OpenStack Services’ functionalities and the communication between them.
Four OpenStack services, namely FCompute, FImage, FBlockStorage, and FIdentity are con-
sidered ideal while two communication functions, namely FSMT and FExtNet are not.
The communication functions, FSMT and FExtNet, indicate the internal and exter-
nal networks respectively, which leak information to the environment E through the
adversary A. The adversary may corrupt any service at anytime. Here, we have
considered two type of corruption: partial and full corruption. In full-corrupt (active
adversary), the adversary has full access to the corrupted service and may change its
code/functionality. Therefore, the code needs to be replaced with the corrupt-code.
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This is done by a ”Corrupt” function which contains the following functionalities
(Algorithm 9:
• Receive Message: whenever the service receives a message it will forward it to
the adversary and gives the control to the adversary.
• Send Message: whenever the service receives a message from the adversary
which is meant to be forwarded to another service, it sends the message to the
destination service on behalf of itself (the corrupted service).
• Main: whenever the service receives a message from the adversary which is not
a forwarding message, it will apply the request as the adversary asks to and
sends the result back to the adversary.
Algorithm 9 Corrupted Service
1: function ReceiveMessage
2: Upon receiving (Source, message) from FSMT \FExtNet:
3: Send-FSMT (source, Adversary, message);
4: end function
5:
6: function SendMessage
7: Upon receiving (Adversary, “Forward”, message, destination) from FSMT:
8: Send-FSMT (FService, destination, message);
9: end function
10:
11: function Main
12: Upon receiving a message which does not contain “Forward” &
Source=Adversary from FSMT:
13: Apply the request;
14: Send-FSMT (FService, Adversary, result of the request);
15: end function
For partial-corrupt (passive adversary), the only difference is that the adversary
has the opportunity to see user credentials. In this case, the adversary doesn’t change
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the corrupted service’s code.
Communication Functionalities The ideal services communicate with each
other via secure message transmission FSMT. Additionally, they use an external net-
work FExtNet to communicate with the user’s Dashboard program. In other word, for
a service-to-service communication (say compute service wants to send a message to
image service), Send-FSMT (FCompute, FImage, message) command is used, while for a
user to service (or vise versa) communication (say compute service wants to send a
message to user B), Send-FExtNet (FCompute, B, message) command is used.
External Network (FExtNet): Algorithm 10 represents the external network be-
tween the user/E and the cloud. In order to preserve confidentiality, whenever a
message is received, FExtNet removes user credentials from the message and sends the
shortened message to the adversary and waits for it’s respond. The request message
will be forwarded to the destination whenever the adversary replies by a confirmation
message.
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Algorithm 10 External Network
1: function ExternalNetwork
2: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver, Message):
3: StoreBuffer(Sender, Receiver, Message);
4: Create New-Message by removing the credentials and replacing them by their
IDs; % i.e. Service-id, user-id
5: Send-Adversary(Sender, Receiver, New-Message);
6:
7: Upon receiving (“Confirm”, session-id) from Adversary:
8: if FindBuffer (Sender, Receiver, Message) where it’s session ID=session-id
then
9: RemoveBuffer(Sender, Receiver, Message) where it’s session-ID=session-
id;
10: Send-Receiver(Sender, Message);
11: end if
12: end function
Secure Message Transmission (FSMT): Algorithm 11 represents the internal mes-
sage queue of the cloud. It handles the communication between services by protecting
integrity and confidentiality. Services communicate with each other through FSMT.
Thus, any message that is sent from one service to another is transmitted through
FSMT. In order to handle the adversarial interruption, FSMT removes credentials from
the original message and gives the control to A by sending the shortened message
(the message without the credential). However, in the case of corruption, FSMT will
not remove the credential of the messages that are sent to the corrupted service.
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Algorithm 11 Secure Message Transmission
1: function SMT
2: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver,Message):
3: if Sender=Adversary or Receiver=Adversary then
4: Send-Receiver (Sender, Message);
5: else
6: StoreBuffer(Sender, Receiver, Message);
7: if Flag(Sender)=True then
8: Send-Adversary(Sender, Receiver, Message);
9: else
10: Create New-Message by removing the credentials and replacing them
by their IDs;
11: Send-Adversary(Sender, Receiver, New-Message);
12: end if
13: end if
14: Upon receiving (“Confirm”, session-id) from Adversary:
15: if FindBuffer (Sender, Receiver, Message) where it’s session ID=session-id
then
16: RemoveBuffer(Sender, Receiver, Message);
17: Send-Receiver(Sender, Message);
18: end if
19: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Service, value, Corrupt-Code) from Adversary:
20: if value=“Active” then
21: Send-Service(“Corrupt”,Corrupt-Code);
22: else
23: Flag(Service)=True;
24: end if
25: end function
Dashboard: It is the interface between the user/E and services (Algorithm 12).
It gets the input from user/E, changes it into a format that is understandable by the
services, adds user credentials and sends it to the requested service and vices versa.
Dummy Adversary A: We consider a dummy adversary A, Algorithm 13, which
by receiving any message will simply forward it to the environment E and waits for
the environment’s response. E may either send a confirmation message, arbitrary
message or a message that informs a corruption to a service. Next, A forwards the
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Algorithm 12 Dashboard
1: function Dashboard
2: Upon receiving Request-Message from Env:
3: User U Creates (UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds);
4: Send-FExtNet(UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds);
5:
6: Upon receiving (Sender, Output-Message) from FExtNet:
7: Output (Output-Message) to Env;
8: end function
received message (from E) to the destination which is either the external network or
SMT.
Algorithm 13 Dummy Adversary
1: function Adversary
2: Upon receiving (message) from FExtNet/FSMT:
3: Send-Env(message);
4:
5: Upon receiving (message) from Env:
6: Send-FExtNet/FSMT (message);
7:
8: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Service, value, Corrupt-Code) from Env:
9: Send-FSMT (”Corrupt”, Service, value, Corrupt-Code);
10: end function
Compute (FCompute): Algorithm 14 represents compute service. This algorithm
covers the following functionalities.
Create Node function: For a user to create a node, compute first checks with
identity (FIdentity) to determine whether the user is permitted to create a node with
the given structure and, if so, forwards the request to Image service (FImage). FImage
will also check with FIdentity to determine whether the user is permitted to access
the image and, if so, returns the corresponding image back to FCompute. Based on
the Image service result, FCompute may create the node and notify the user with the
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result.
Delete Node function: For a user to delete a node, FCompute first checks with
FIdentity to determine whether the user is permitted to delete the node. If the user is
allowed to delete the node and the node exists, FCompute deletes the node and notifies
the user.
Access Node function: For a user to access a node, FCompute first checks whether
the user making the request is allowed to access the node and, if so, forwards the
request to the intended node. The node will also check if the user issuing the request
is allowed to make node accesses and will only execute the request if the user is
permitted to do so. After completing or rejecting the request, the node will return
its response to FCompute which will forward it to the user who issued the request.
Attach/Detach function: In order to attach or detach a volume to/from a compute
node a user issues a request to FCompute. FCompute will check with FIdentity to determine
whether the user is permitted to perform attach/detach operations on that node and
will request that the storage service (FBlockStorage) makes the volume available if so.
The storage service will also validate the user’s credentials and will only make the
volume available if the user is permitted to attach/detach it. FBlockStorage will then
respond to FCompute and, if the volume is available, FCompute will indicate to the node
that it should be attached/detached, and report the result to the user.
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Algorithm 14 Compute
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FCompute with code of Corrupted FCompute
4: end function
5:
6: function (Attach/Detach) Volume
7: Upon receiving (Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds,
volume-id, node-id) from FExtNet:
8: StoreBuffer (Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-
id, node-id);
9: Send-FSMT ( FCompute, FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id, credscompute,
creds, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”);
10:
11: Upon receiving (FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id,
Request, valid) from FSMT:
12: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-
id, node-id) then
13: if valid=True then
14: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds,
volume-id, node-id }, {Receiver, “Storage (Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id,
creds, volume-id, node-id });
15: Send-FSMT (FCompute, FBlockStorage, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, creds, volume-id, node-id);
16: else
17: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds,
volume-id, node-id);
18: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, volume-id, node-id, Fail);
19: end if
20: end if
21:
22: Upon receiving (FBlockStorage, Result, session-id) from FSMT:
23: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Storage (Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, creds,
volume-id, node-id) then
24: if Result is Fail then
25: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Storage (Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, creds, volume-id, node-id);
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26: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, volume-id, node-id, Fail);
27: else
28: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, “Storage (Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, creds, volume-id, node-id }, {FCompute, FNode,“(Attach/Detach) Volume”,
session-id, volume-id, node-id });
29: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, FNode, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id,
volume-id, node-id);
30: end if
31: end if
32:
33: Upon receiving (FNode, ”(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, Result) from
FSMT:
34: if FindBuffer(FCompute, FNode, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id, volume-
id, node-id) then
35: if Result is Fail then
36: RemoveBuffer(FCompute, FNode, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id,
volume-id, node-id);
37: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-
id, volume-id, node-id, Fail);
38: else
39: RemoveBuffer(FCompute, FNode, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id,
volume-id, node-id);
40: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, FNode, “(Attach/Detach) Volume”, session-id,
volume-id, node-id), Success;
41: end if
42: end if
43: end function
44:
45: function AccessNode
46: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActiv-
ity, creds):
47: StoreBuffer(Receiver, “Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-id, RequestAc-
tivity) from FExtNet;
48: if node-id is in list of active Nodes & user user-id is allowed to access node-id
then
49: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, “Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-id, Re-
questActivity},{Receiver, “Execute Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-id });
50: Send-SMT(FCompute, FNode, “Execute Access Node”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, RequestActivity);
51: else
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52: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-id, Re-
questActivity);
53: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Access Node”, session-id, NULL, Fail);
54: end if
55:
56: Upon receiving (FNode, “Node Accessed”, session-id, results, valid) from FSMT:
57: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Execute Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-id)
then
58: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Execute Node Access”, session-id, node-id, user-
id);
59: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Access Node”, session-id, result, valid);
60: end if
61: end function
62:
63: function CreateNode
64: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Create Node”,session-id, creds, image-id, Node-
Structure) from FExtNet:
65: StoreBuffer (Receiver, “Validate Create Node”, session-id, creds, image-id,
Node-Structure);
66: Send-FSMT ( FCompute, FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id, credscompute,
creds, “Create Node”);
67:
68: Upon receiving (FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id,
Request, valid) from FSMT:
69: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Validate Create Node”, session-id, creds, image-id,
Node-Structure, node-id) then
70: if valid=True then
71: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, “Validate Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid}, {Receiver, “Get Image Create Node”, session-
id, creds, image-id, Node-Structure});
72: Send-FSMT (FCompute, FImage, “Get Image”, session-id, creds, image-id);
73: else
74: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Validate Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid);
75: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Node Created”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
76: end if
77: end if
78:
79: Upon receiving (FImage, “Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image )
from FSMT:
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80: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Get Image Create Node”, session-id, creds, image-id,
Node-Structure) then
81: if Corresponding-Image = NULL then
82: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Get Image Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure);
83: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Node Created”,session-id, NULL,
Fail);
84: else
85: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Request Node ID”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure})
86: Send-FSMT ( FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
87: end if
88: end if
89:
90: Upon receiving (Adversary, “Node ID”, session-id, node-id) from FSMT:
91: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Request Node ID”, session-id, creds, image-id, Node-
Structure) then
92: node-struct=Node-Structure;
93: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Request Node ID”, session-id, creds, image-id,
Node-Structure);
94: if node-id is not used then
95: Add (node-id, user-id, node-struct) to the list of active nodes;
96: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Node Created”, session-id, node-id,
Successful);
97: else
98: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Node Created”, session-id, node-id,
Fail);
99: end if
100: end if
101: end function
102:
103: function DeleteNode
104: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, creds) from
FExtNet:
105: StoreBuffer (Receiver, “Validate Delete Node”, session-id, creds, node-id);
106: Send-FSMT (FCompute, FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id, credscompute,
creds, “Delete node-id ”);
107:
108: Upon receiving (FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id,
Request, valid) from FSMT:
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109: if FindBuffer(Receiver, “Validate Delete Node”, session-id, creds, node-id)
then
110: node-ID=node-id;
111: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, “Validate Delete Node”, session-id, creds, node-
id);
112: if valid=True & there is node with node-ID then
113: Delete node with node-ID;
114: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Delete Node”, session-id, node-ID,
Successful);
115: else
116: Send-FExtNet (FCompute, Receiver, “Delete Node”, session-id, node-ID,
Fail);
117: end if
118: end if
119: end function
Image: Algorithm 15 represents only ”get image” functionality of image service.
Get Image functionality needs to access identity services for validating the user and
its request to get the image related to the image-id mentioned in the request-message.
BlockStorage: Algorithm 16 represents block storage service. This algorithm
only covers ”Attach/Detach volume” functionalities.
Attach/Detach Volume function: When compute service makes an attach/detach
volume request, block storage first checks with identity to determine whether the
user is permitted to perform attach/detach operations on that node. If the user is
eligible and the volume-id exists, block storage makes a request to volume service to
attach/detach the volume. The storage service will then respond to compute (if the
volume is available).
Volume: Algorithm 17 represents Volume service. This algorithm only covers
”Attach/Detach” and ”access” functionalities.
Attach/Detach function: By receiving a request from block storage service, volume
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Algorithm 15 Image
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FImage with code of Corrupted FImage
4: end function
5: function GetImage
6: Upon receiving (FCompute, “Get Image”, session-id, creds, image-id) from FSMT:
7: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
8: StoreBuffer(FCompute, “Get Image”, session-id, creds, image-id);
9: Send-FSMT (FImage, FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id, credsImage,
creds, “Get Image image-id ”);
10: end if
11:
12: Upon receiving (FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-id,
Request, valid) from FSMT:
13: if FindBuffer(FCompute, “Get Image”, session-id, creds, image-id) then
14: Image-ID=image-id;
15: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, creds, image-id);
16: if valid=False OR No such image-id then
17: Corresponding-Image=NULL;
18: else
19: Corresponding-Image=extract the corresponding image for Image-ID;
20: end if
21: Send-FSMT (FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-id, Image-ID,
Corresponding-Image );
22: end if
23: end function
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Algorithm 16 BlockStorage
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FBlockStorage with code of Corrupted FBlockStorage
4: end function
5: function AttachVolume
6: Upon receiving (Source, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id, node-
id)
7: if Source is FCompute then
8: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
9: StoreBuffer(Source, “Attach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id,
node-id);
10: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
credsBlock, creds, ”Attach Volume volume-id to node node-id ”);
11: end if
12: Upon receiving (FIdentity, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid) from FSMT:
13: if FindBuffer(Source, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id, node-
id) then
14: RemoveBuffer(Source, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id,
node-id);
15: if valid=False or No such volume-id then
16: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, Source,”Fail”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id);
17: else
18: StoreBuffer(FIdentity, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid)
19: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, FVolume, “Attach”, session-id, volume-id,
node-id);
20: Upon receiving (FVolume, Response, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
from FSMT:
21: FindBuffer(FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid);
22: if Request not in Buffer then
23: Ignore message
24: else
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25: RemoveBuffer(FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid);
26: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, Source, Response, session-id, volume-
id, node-id);
27: end if
28: end if
29: end if
30: end if
31: end function
32: function DetachVolume
33: Upon receiving (Source, “Detach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id, node-
id)
34: if Source is FCompute then
35: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
36: StoreBuffer(Source, “Detach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id,
node-id);
37: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id,
credsBlock, creds, “Detach Volume volume-id fron Node node-id ”);
38: end if
39: Upon receiving (FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid) from FSMT:
40: if FindBuffer(Source, “Detach Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id) then
41: RemoveBuffer(Source, “Get Volume”, session-id, creds, volume-id);
42: if valid=False or No such volume-id then
43: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, Source, “Fail”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id);
44: else
45: StoreBuffer(FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid)
46: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, FVolume, “Detach”, session-id, volume-id,
node-id);
47: Upon receiving (FVolume, Response, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
from FSMT:
48: FindBuffer(FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid);
49: if Request not in Buffer then
50: Ignore message
51: else
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52: RemoveBuffer(FIdentity, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid);
53: Send-FSMT (FBlockStorage, Source, Response, session-id, volume-
id, node-id);
54: end if
55: end if
56: end if
57: end if
58: end function
service makes sure that the volume-id is correct, then attaches/detaches the volume
to/from the compute node.
Access Node function: This functionality performs the user’s requested operation
for a compute node.
Node: Algorithm 18 represents a Node with two functionalities; to execute a
request and to attach/detach volume.
ExecuteRequest function: When compute service forwards an execution-request
on behalf of the user to the intended node, the node will check if the user is allowed
to make node accesses and if so, executes the request. After completing or rejecting
the request the node will return its response to compute.
Attach/Detach function: When the compute service indicate to the node that it
should attach/detach a specific volume, the node attaches/detaches the volume and
notifies compute.
Identity: Algorithm 19 gets validation request from any service; validates the
request based on its stored information and sends the validation result to the requested
service.
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Algorithm 17 Volume
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FVolume with code of Corrupted FVolume
4: end function
5: function Attach
6: Upon receiving (Sender, “Attach”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id)
from FSMT:
7: if Sender is FBlockStorage and volume-id is correct then
8: Set AttachedNode=node-id;
9: Send-FSMT (FVolume, FBlockStorage, “Success”, session-id);
10: else
11: Send-FSMT (FVolume, FBlockStorage, “Fail”, session-id);
12: end if
13: end function
14: function Detach
15: Upon receiving (Sender, “Detach”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id)
from FSMT:
16: if Sender is FBlockStorage and volume-id is correct and AttachedNode=node-id
then
17: Set AttachedNode=None;
18: Send-FSMT (FVolume, FBlockStorage, “Success”, session-id);
19: else
20: Send-FSMT (FVolume, FBlockStorage, “Fail”, session-id);
21: end if
22: end function
23: function Access
24: Upon receiving (Sender, “Access”, operation, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) from FSMT:
25: if Sender is AttachedNode and volume-id is correct then
26: perform operation
27: Send-FSMT (FVolume, Sender, “Success”, data requested, session-id);
28: else
29: Send-FSMT (FVolume, Sender, “Fail”, session-id);
30: end if
31: end function
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Algorithm 18 Node
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FNode with code of Fully Corrupted FNode
4: end function
5: function Attach
6: Upon receiving (Sender, “Attach”, volume-id) from FSMT:
7: if Source is FCompute then
8: if attached-volume is None then
9: Set attached-volume to volume-id
10: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Attach Volume”, session-id, Success);
11: else
12: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Detach Volume”, session-id, Fail);
13: end if
14: end if
15: end function
16:
17: function Detach
18: Upon receiving (Sender, “Detach”, volume-id) from FSMT:
19: if Source is FCompute then
20: if attached-volume is volume-id then
21: Set attached-volume to None
22: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Detach Volume”, session-id, Success);
23: else
24: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Detach Volume”, session-id, Fail);
25: end if
26: end if
27: end function
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28: function ExecuteRequest
29: Upon receiving (FCompute, “Execute Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
AccessRequest) from FSMT:
30: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U and U is the owner of
the node then
31: if AccessRequest requires data then
32: StoreBuffer(FNode, FVolume, “Access”, data specified by AccessRequest,
session-id, user-id, node-id)
33: Send-FSMT (FNode, FVolume, “Access”, data specified by AccessRequest,
session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id)
34: Upon receiving (FVolume, FNode, “Success”, data, session-id) from FSMT:
35: Store returned data
36: end if
37: results ← Execute(AccessRequest);
38: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Node Accessed”, session-id, results, Success-
ful);
39: else
40: Send-FSMT (FNode, FCompute, “Node Accessed”, session-id, None, Fail);
41: end if
42: end function
Algorithm 19 Identity
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FIdentity with code of Corrupted FIdentity
4: end function
5: function ServiceValidation
6: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Service Validation”, session-id, credsservice, creds,
Request) from FSMT:
7: if credsservice & creds are valid & creds is allowed to perform the Request then
8: valid=True;
9: else
10: valid=False;
11: end if
12: Send-FSMT (FIdentity, Receiver, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid);
13: end function
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4.3 Simulator for Ideal Cloud with Bearer Tokens
We show the complete simulator S for the ideal cloud using bearer tokens in Algorithm
20. Here, the simulator gets input from the ideal cloud and environment E and based
on the conditions it either response to or convert them into intermediate messages
and sends them to the desired destination. S buffers received information from the
ideal cloud to make future decisions and keeps the state of each request.
In the OpenStack Services world, whenever a service is corrupted, the adversary
gets access to the information that is stored in the services database such as user
credentials which have unfinalized requests or have made a new request. This situation
should also be correct in the ideal cloud/simulator world. Therefore, in the case of
corruption, the cloud sends some extra information such as a list of affected user-id
to S. The simulator then creates and stores a credential per each user-id and uses it
as needed in the following messages.
Note that, since the bearer token is an unscoped multi usage token, the adversary
is able to make different requests on behalf of the compromised user. Also, she is
able to send the same request more than once to another service. To realize these
properties, we had to relax the security assumption of the ideal cloud and enable
extra functionalities (explained in Table 4.1). For example, in the normal situation
(no corruption), the ideal cloud only accepts requests from the API and no request is
accepted from simulator, however, in the case of corruption (e.g. adversary corrupts
image service), if the adversary sends a CreateNode request on behalf of a corrupted
user (by attaching the user’s credential to the message), then the simulator only
checks the credential and hands the request message to the ideal cloud and the ideal
cloud will respond to the request.
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Algorithm 20 Simulator with corrupted services for bearer token
1: function Simulator(message)
2: Upon receiving (”Corrupt”, Service, value, corrupt-code) from Env:
3: Corrupt[Service]=value; %value=passive or Active. For passive corruption,
there would be no changes in the ideal cloud functionality. However, the simulator
leaks the credentials of the users when a message is sent or received by a corrupted
service. For this reason, only the credential should be added to the message (which
is ignored in this code).
4: if FindServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id, credsservice) & credsservice =NULL
then
5: Credential= Generate credential for the service;
6: credsservice =Credential;
7: UpdateServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id, credsservice);
8: end if
9: Send-IdealCloud(”Corrupt”, Service,value);
10:
11: Upon receiving (DB of (image-id, corresponding-Image),List of (user-id)) from
Ideal Cloud:
12: StoreDB (All (image-id, corresponding-Image));
13: Create unique Credential per each user-id in the List if it has not been created
before;
14: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential);
15:
16: Upon receiving DB of (user-id, roles))from Ideal Cloud:
17: Create unique Credential per each user-id in the List if it has not been created
before;
18: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential, roles);
19:
20: Upon receiving List of (user-id)from Ideal Cloud:
21: Create unique Credential per each user-id in the List if it has not been created
before;
22: storeBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential);
23:
24: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver, message) from Env:
25: if Receiver=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
26: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
27: else if Receiver=FIdentity & Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
28: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
29: else if Receiver=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
30: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
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31: else if Receiver=FBlockStorage & Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” then
32: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
33: else if Receiver=FNodenode-id & Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
34: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
35: else if Receiver=FVolumevolume-id & Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active”
then
36: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
37: end if
38:
39: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity) from Cloud:
40: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, RequestAc-
tivity)
41: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, RequestAc-
tivity)
42:
43: Upon receiving (”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, result, valid)
44: StoreBuffer(”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, result, valid)
45: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, result, valid)
46:
47: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, Re-
questActivity) from Env:
48: Send-IdealCloud(Adversary, ”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestAc-
tivity)
49:
50: Upon Receiving (”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity, results)
from IdealCloud
51: Send-Env(”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity, results);
52:
53: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
Cloud:
54: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
55: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
56:
57: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
58: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
59: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
60:
61: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
62: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
63: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
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64: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
65: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
66: Send-Env (FIdentity, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
67:
68: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, node-id,
RequestActivity) from Env:
69: Send-IdealCloud(Adversary, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity);
70:
71: Upon Receiving (”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
72: if (Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active”) &
(Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active”) then
73: Send-Env(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
74: else
75: Send-Env(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
76: end if
77:
78: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
Cloud:
79: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
80: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
81:
82: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
83: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
84: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
85:
86: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
87: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
88: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
89:
90: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
91: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
92: Send-Env (FIdentity, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
93:
94: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, node-id,
RequestActivity) from Env:
95: Send-IdealCloud(Adversary, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity)
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96: Upon Receiving (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
97: if (Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active”) or
(Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active”) then
98: Send-Env(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
99: else
100: Send-Env(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
101: end if
102:
103: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure) from Ideal Cloud:
104: StoreBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure);
105: Send-Env(Receiver, FCompute, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure);
106:
107: Upon receiving (”validation”,user-id, session-id, Request, valid) from Ideal-
Cloud:
108: if FindBuffer(”Result, Service, destination, message) with request-
ID=session-id then
109: UpdateBuffer({”Result”, FService, destination, message},
{Receiver=destination, Sender= FService, ”Service validated”, session-id,
Request, valid});
110: Send-Env(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, Request, valid);
111: end if
112:
113: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, request) from Env:
114: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
115: Send-IdealCloud(”MainComputeCorrupt”, request);
116: end if
117:
118: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, Corresponding-Image, valid) from
IdealCloud:
119: if FindBuffer(”Result, Service, destination, message) with request-
ID=session-id then
120: UpdateBuffer({”Result”, FService, destination, message}, {FImage,
FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid});
121: StoreDB(image-id, Corresponding-Image);% if this image is not stored in
the Sim DB, then store it.
122: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id FImage-id,
user-id, ”Get Image image-id ”);
123: end if
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124: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Corrupted Get
Image”) from Ideal Cloud:
125: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”);
126: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node”);
127:
128: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image)
from Ideal Cloud:
129: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Im-
age result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid) then
130: if Corresponding-Image=NULL then
131: valid= False;
132: else
133: valid= True;
134: end if
135:
136: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid});
137: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-id, image-id, ,
Corresponding-Image);
138: end if
139:
140: Upon receiving (”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, valid) from Ide-
alCloud:
141: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id) then
142: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Create Node Output”, session-id })
143: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
144: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid,node-id) then
145: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver,”Create Node node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid,node-id },{Receiver, ”Cre-
ate Node Output”, session-id });
146: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
147: end if
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148: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Node ID”, session-id, node-id) from
Env:
149: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” & FindBuffer (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image) then
150: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Node ID continue”,
session-id, node-id });
151: Send-IdealCloud (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image, node-id);
152: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node get
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid) then
153: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node get node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid,node-id })
154: Send-IdealCloud(”Node ID”, session-id, node-id, Corresponding-Image);
155: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Request Node ID”, session-id) then
156: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Request Node ID”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id })
157: Send-IdealCloud (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id);
158: end if
159:
160: Upon receiving (Adversary, Receiver, ”Forward”, message, destination) from
Env:
161: if Receiver=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
162: if Destination is not a service then
163: StoreBuffer(”Output”, FCompute, destination, message);
164: else
165: StoreBuffer(FCompute, destination, message);
166: end if
167: Send-Env(FCompute, destination, message);
168: else if Receiver=FIdentity & Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
169: if destination=FCompute & Request=”Delete Node” & message is ”Ser-
vice Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”,
session-id, user-id, node-id) then
170: extract the valid value from the message;
171: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id }, {Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid});
172: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
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173: else if destination=FCompute & Request=”Create Node with Node-
Structure” & message is ”Service Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create
Node validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
174: extract the valid value from the message;
175: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure}, {Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
176: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
177: else if destination=FImage & Request=”Get Image image-id ” & mes-
sage is ”Service Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
178: extract the Image-valid value from the message;
179: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validated”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid}, {Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid});
180: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
181: else
182: StoreBuffer(FIdentity, destination, message);
183: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
184: end if
185: else if Receiver=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
186: if destination= FCompute & message=(”Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image ) & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) where the message session-ID=session-
id then
187: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image});
188: else
189: StoreBuffer(FImage, destination, message);
190: end if
191: Send-Env(FImage, destination, message);
192: end if
193:
194: Upon receiving (Adversary, FImage, ”Get Image”, image-id) from Env:
195: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
196: if image-id exist then
197: Corresponding-Image= extract the corresponding image for image-id;
198: else
199: Corresponding-Image= NULL;
200: end if
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201: Send-Env (FImage, Adversary, ”Image”, image-id, Corresponding-Image );
202: end if
203:
204: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
Ideal cloud:
205: StoreBuffer(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
206: Send-Env(Receiver, FCompute, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, user-id);
207:
208: Upon receiving (”MainComputeCorruptResult”, result) from IdealCloud:
209: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, result);
210:
211: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist) from Ideal Cloud:
212: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid, NodeExist);
213: if valid= True & NodeExist= True then
214: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, success-
ful );
215: else
216: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail );
217: end if
218: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from Env:
219: if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure) then
220: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
221: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential) then
222: creds =Credential;
223: else
224: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
225: creds = Credential;
226: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential);
227: end if
228: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure);
229: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
230: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure},{Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure});
231: Request=”Create Node with Node-Structure”;
232: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Service-
id, user-id, Request);
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233: else if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
234: Send-IdealCloud(”Confirm”, session-id);
235: else
236: Send-IdealCloud(”Confirm”, session-id);
237: end if
238: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure) then
239: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
240: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential,roles) then
241: creds =Credential;
242: else
243: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
244: creds = Credential;
245: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential,roles);
246: end if
247: Extract credsservice from ServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id,
credsservice) where Service=FCompute;
248: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver,”Create Node validated”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure});
249: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, ”Service validation, session-id,
credsservice, creds, Request);
250: end if
251: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, valid) then
252: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
253: if valid= False then
254: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node result continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
255: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
256: else
257: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
258: Send-Env(FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-
id);
259: end if
260: end if
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261: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node result continue”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
262: Send-IdealCloud(”Create Node Output valid”, session-id, Fail);
263: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
264: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
265: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, compute-id,
user-id, Request=”Get Image image-id ”);
266: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
267: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
268: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential,roles) then
269: creds =Credential;
270: else
271: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
272: creds = Credential;
273: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential,roles);
274: end if
275: Extract credsservice from ServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id,
credsservice) where Service=FImage;
276: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
277: Send-Env (FImage, Adversary, ”Service validation, session-id,
credsservice, creds, Request=”Get Image image-id ”);
278: end if
279: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid) then
280: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
281: if Image-valid= False then
282: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid}, {Receiver,”Create Node re-
sult continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Fail});
283: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
284: else
285: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get
Image result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid})
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286: Send-IdealCloud(”Get Image”, session-id, image-id);
287: end if
288: end if
289: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid) then
290: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & valid= False then
291: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},
{Receiver,”Create Node result continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Fail});
292: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL, Fail);
293: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & valid= True then
294: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},
{Receiver,”Create Node get node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid});
295: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
296: end if
297: else if FindBuffer(FCompute, destination, message) where the request-ID in
the message is equal to session-id then
298: if destination=FIdentity then
299: if Corrupt[Identity] !=”Active” then
300: valid=Fail;
301: if (user-id,creds,roles) ∈ BufferUserCorrupt & request in the mes-
sage ∈ roles then
302: valid=Successful;
303: end if
304: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message},
{Receiver=destination, Sender= FCompute, ”Service validated”, session-id,
Request, valid});
305: Send-Env(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, Request, valid);
306: else
307: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);
308: end if
309:
310: else if destination=FImage then
311: if Corrupt[Image] !=”Active” then
312: if (user-id,creds) ∈ BufferUserCorrupt then
313: extract user-id from the message;
314: Message= message that the user credential is replaced by user-
id;
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315: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message},{”Result”,
FCompute, destination, message});
316: Send-IdealCloud(Message);
317: else
318: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message}, {FImage,
FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, NULL, Fail});
319: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
FImage-id, user-id, ”Get Image image-id ”);
320: end if
321: else
322: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);
323: end if
324: end if
325: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, session-id, Request,
valid) then
326: if Sender=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
327: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, message);
328: else if Sender=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
329: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, message);
330: end if
331: else if FindBuffer(FImage, destination, message) where the session-ID in the
message is equal to session-id then
332: if destination= FCompute & message=(”Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image ) & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) where the message request-
ID=session-id then
333: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image});
334: RemoveBuffer(FImage, destination, message);
335: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
336: else if destination=FIdentity then
337: if Corrupt[Identity] !=”Active” then
338: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Credential, ServiceObject-List,
Black-List) where request-ID=session-id & Credential=creds & (FImage,Object)
∈ ServiceObject-List & FImage /∈ Black-List then
339: AddBlack-Listsession-id(FImage);
340: valid=successful;
341: else
342: valid=fail;
343: end if
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344: StoreBuffer(Receiver=destination, Sender= FImage, ”Service vali-
dated”, session-id, Request, valid);
345: Send-Env(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, Request, valid);
346: else
347: Send-Env(FImage, Adversary, message);
348: end if
349: end if
350: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
351: UpdateBuffer({FImage, FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”},{FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-
id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid”});
352: Send-Env (FIdentity, FImage, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request=”Get Image image-id ”, valid);
353: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-id, image-
id, Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
354: UpdateBuffer({FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-id, image-
id, Corresponding-Image, valid”}, {FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-
id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid”});
355: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-idimage-id, Corresponding-
Image);
356: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
357: RemoveBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”);
358: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
359: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);
360: end if
361: else if FindBuffer(”Output”, Service, destination, message) then
362: UpdateBuffer({”Output”, Service, destination, message},{”Output Con-
tinue”, Service, destination, message})
363: if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message contains
”Delete Node” then
364: Send-Env(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
365: else if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message con-
tains ”Create Node” then
366: Send-Env(Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
367: end if
368: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) then
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369: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”},{Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”})
370: Send-Env(FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Compute-id, ”Create Node”, Successful);
371: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) then
372: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”})
373: Send-Env(FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id);
374: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”) then
375: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”});
376: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
377: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential) then
378: creds =Credential;
379: else
380: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
381: creds =Credential;
382: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential);
383: end if
384: Send-Env(FImage, Adversary, message = (”Get Image”, session-id,
creds, image-id));
385: end if
386: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id) then
387: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id);
388: Send-IdealCloud(”Create Node Output”, session-id);
389: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist) then
390: Send-IdealCloud(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
391: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) then
392: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
393: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential) then
394: creds =Credential;
395: else
396: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
397: creds =Credential;
398: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential);
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399: end if
400: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
creds);
401: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
402: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id },
{Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id });
403: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
Compute-id, user-id, ”Delete Node”);
404: else
405: Send-IdealCloud(”Confirm”, session-id);
406: end if
407: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id) then
408: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
409: if FindBufferUserCorrupt(user-id, Credential,roles) then
410: creds =Credential;
411: else
412: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
413: creds =Credential;
414: StoreBufferUserCorrupt(user-id,Credential,roles);
415: end if
416: if FindBuffServiceCorrupt(Service-id, Credential) then
417: credsservice =Credential;
418: else
419: Credential= Generate credential for the service;
420: credsservice =Credential;
421: StoreBufferServiceCorrupt(Service-id,Credential);
422: end if
423: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-
id, user-id, node-id }, {Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id });
424: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
credsservice, creds);
425: end if
426: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id, user-
id, node-id, valid) then
427: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
428: if valid= False then
429: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid}, {Receiver,”Corrupt Output Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid});
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430: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
Fail);
431: else
432: RemoveBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid);
433: Send-IdealCloud(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
434: end if
435: end if
436: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Output Delete Node”, session-id, user-
id, node-id, valid) then
437: Send-IdealCloud(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
438: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Re-
questActivity) then
439: Send-IdealCloud(”Result Access Node”, session-id)
440: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, re-
sult, valid) then
441: Send-IdealCloud(”Output Access Node”, session-id)
442: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
443: if Identity is Corrupt then
444: valid = validity setting used by simulated adversary
445: else
446: valid=False
447: end if
448: Send-IdealCloud(”Confirm Attach Volume”, session-id, valid)
449: else if FindBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
then
450: Send-IdealCloud(”Result Attach Volume”, session-id)
451: else if FindBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, suc-
cess/fail) then
452: Send-IdealCloud(”Output Attach Volume”, session-id)
453: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
454: if Identity is Corrupt then
455: valid = validity setting used by simulated adversary
456: else
457: valid=False
458: end if
459: Send-IdealCloud(”Confirm Detach Volume”, session-id, valid)
460: else if FindBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
then
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461: Send-IdealCloud(”Result Detach Volume”, session-id)
462: else if FindBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, suc-
cess/fail) then
463: Send-IdealCloud(”Output Detach Volume”, session-id)
464: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image) then
465: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image});
466: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
467: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Service Validation”, session-id, Service-
id, user-id, node-id, valid) then
468: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Delete Service Validation”, session-id Service-
id, user-id, node-id, valid},{Receiver, ”Delete Service Validated”, session-id,
Service-id, user-id, node-id, Valid})
469: Send-Env (FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid);
470: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid) then
471: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Delete Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid},{Receiver, ”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid});
472: Send-IdealCloud (”Delete Node Output”, session-id, continue);
473: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Output Delete Node”, session-id) then
474: Send-IdealCloud(”Output Delete Node”, session-id);
475: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image)
then
476: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-
Image},{Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Service-id,
”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
477: Send-Env(FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid);
478: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image) then
479: if create-valid=successful then
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480: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
481: Send-Env (FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-
id);
482: else
483: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id });
484: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
485: end if
486: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
487: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get
Image Service Validation”, session-id, image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image});
488: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, FImage-id,
user-id, ”Get Image Image-id”);
489: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validation”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
490: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validation”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver,
”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id, image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image})
491: Send-Env(FIdentity, FImage, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Fimage-id, ”Get Image image-id”, Image-valid);
492: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
493: if Image-valid =false then
494: Corresponding-Image=NULL
495: end if
496: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get Image
Continue”, session-id, image-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
497: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-
Image);
498: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
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499: if Corresponding-Image= NULL then
500: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Imaged},{Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-
id })
501: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
502: else
503: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Imaged},{Receiver, ”Request Node ID”, session-id
})
504:
505: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
506: end if
507: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id) then
508: RemoveBuffer (Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id);
509: Send-IdealCloud (”Create Node Output”, session-id);
510: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id) then
511: RemoveBuffer (Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id);
512: Send-IdealCloud (”Create Node Output”, session-id);
513: else if FindBuffer(”Output Continue”, Service, destination, message) then
514: RemoveBuffer(”Output Continue”, Service, destination, message);
515: if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message contains
”Delete Node” then
516: Send-IdealCloud(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
517: else if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message con-
tains ”Create Node” then
518: Send-IdealCloud(Receiver, ”Create Node result”, session-id, node-id,
valid);
519: end if
520: end if
521:
522: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, valid)
from Ideal Cloud:
523: Service-id=Service-id for FCompute
524: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Service Validation”, session-id, Service-id,
user-id, node-id, valid);
525: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Delete node-id ”);
526: Upon receiving (”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, Valid, NodeExist)
from IdealCloud:
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527: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid) then
528: UpdateBuffer ({”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid}, {”Output Delete Node”, session-id })
529: if NodeExist= False or Valid= False then
530: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
Fail);
531: else
532: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Suc-
cessful);
533: end if
534: end if
535:
536: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure) from Ideal Cloud:
537: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Create Node”, Successful, ”Get Image”, Successful, Corresponding-Image);
538: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node Node-Structure”);
539:
540: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Get Image”, Node-Structure) from Ideal Cloud:
541: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, ”Create
Node”, Successful, ”Get Image”, Fail, NULL);
542: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node Node-Structure”);
543: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Create Node”, Node-Structure) from Ideal Cloud:
544: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, ”Create
Node”, Fail, ”Get Image”, Fail, NULL);
545: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node with Node-Structure”);
546:
547: Upon receiving (”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, valid) from Ide-
alCloud:
548: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id) then
549: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Create Node Output”, session-id })
550: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
551: end if
552: end function
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4.4 Analysis
In this chapter we prove Theorem 2; we demonstrate that the ideal cloud UC-emulates
the OpenStack Services. As with most UC analyses, our argument proceeds via
induction on the steps taken by the environment E. We show that for any message
that E might send, the next incoming message received by E maintains the invariant
that E’s view in the ideal cloud and OpenStack Services is identical. More specifically,
for any state that E can reach, the action of the simulator S up to that point must
have ensured that E’s view is the same in both worlds. Ergo, E cannot distinguish
whether it is interacting with the OpenStack Services or with the composition of ideal
cloud and the simulator.
To improve the presentation of this proof, we make the argument in stages. We
begin with a ‘warmup’ analysis (property 1) that makes two simplifying assumptions:
(i) E permits each OpenStack command to complete before executing the next one
and (ii) E has not compromised any OpenStack services. We then remove those
assumptions in pieces. The operation of the ideal cloud and OpenStack Services can
change when E is permitted to interleave commands, yet fortunately both clouds
change in identical ways (property 2). Finally, permitting E to compromise services
causes yet more changes to the behavior, and does so in a manner that depends on how
the token mechanism works, yet once again our invariant is maintained (property 3).
Looking ahead, in Chapters 5 and 6 we will introduce an improved ‘one-time’ token
mechanism and analyze its security. As a result, we purposely provide our proof of
property 3 in a manner that can be partially re-used when considering other token
mechanisms.
In our attempt to balance comprehensiveness with comprehension, we explain
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each property for only one combination of the ideal cloud commands (attach/detach
volume, access node, create node, or get image) and with a focus only on those
OpenStack services most pertinent to the command. We believe that our choices
are ‘representative’ of the properties we wish to demonstrate, in the sense that they
showcase all of the insights involved in the analysis without subjecting the reader to
redundant case analyses for the remaining commands and services.
In more detail, we show the following three properties:
• Property 1: The simulator faithfully emulates the entire workflow required
to process one user-provided command, when viewed standalone. We will
demonstrate this property by analyzing the simulator’s actions in response to
a DeleteNode request; its response to other user actions are more cumbersome
but similar in spirit.
• Property 2: The simulator faithfully emulates two interleaved user-provided
commands such that the resulting state is the correct outcome after executing
the two commands in an adversarially-controlled order. Put differently, there are
no race conditions that cause the services to reach any kind of “weird state”. We
will explain this property by analyzing the simulator’s actions when CreateNode
and DeleteNode requests are interleaved.
• Property 3: An adversary who compromises services can only leverage them
to damage other (uncompromised) services by leveraging OpenStack’s token
mechanism for authentication and authorization. Our ideal worlds accurately
reflect the extent of the damage that the environment can cause by misusing
acquired bearer tokens.
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We will showcase this property by considering an adversary who has compro-
mised only Nova (and not any other services) and who is trying to glean as
much information as possible from Glance. In Chapter 5 and 6, we will show
the analogous property using a stronger ‘one-time’ token mechanism, in which
the simulator responds slightly differently when dealing with service-to-service
interactions.
4.4.1 Property 1: single command
By inspecting a sample command DeleteNode, we show that the view of the Envi-
ronment E is the same for the ideal and OpenStack Services world. For the ideal
world, the simulator S emulates the entire work flow that is required to process a
single user-provided command, when viewed standalone.
In the OpenStack Services world, E interacts with the cloud services through
FExtNet and FSMT. To validate that the OpenStack Services doesn’t leak more in-
formation than the ideal cloud, S emulates the leakage of FExtNet and FSMT in the
OpenStack Services.
For the DeleteNode command, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, the following four types
of messages are leaked through FExtNet and FSMT (in the OpenStack Services) which
the simulator S is in charge to emulate them:
Type-1: A “Delete Node” message from FExtNet of the form (UDashboard, FCompute,
“Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, user-id) sent in Step 3 in Figure 3.3.
Type-2: A “Delete Node Validation” message from FSMT of the form (FCompute,
FIdentity, “Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id, user-id, “Delete node-
id ”) sent in Step 7 in Figure 3.3.
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Type-3: A “Delete Node Validated” message from FSMT of the form (FIdentity, FCompute,
“Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, Compute-id, “Delete node-id ”, valid)
sent in Step 11 in Figure 3.3.
Type-4: A “Notification” message from FExtNet of the form (FCompute, UDashboard,
“Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, result) sent in Step 15 in Figure 3.3.
In OpenStack Services, when the deletenode command is executed, the first message
that E gets is the Type-1 message, which indicates the command that is requested
by the user.
In response, the simulator S acts as follows. Upon receiving a delete node “Request-
message” from FCloud, S runs the Dashboard protocol of the user with user-id with the
input-message “Request-message.” This command activates FExtNet with (UDashboard,
FCompute, “Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, creds) and returns a Type-1 message to
S. Then, S forwards this message to E.
When E hands back the control to the OpenStack Services by sending the message
(“confirmation”, session-id), the Compute service then sends a validation request to
Identity service which is leaked to E through FSMT (Type-2 message).
In order to emulate this leakage so that E’s view is the same in both worlds, the
simulator S sends the environment’s message back to the ideal cloud because it needs
to know the validation result of the “Delete Node” request.
Upon receiving the reply from FCloud of the form (UDashboard, “Delete Node”,
session-id, user-id, node-id, valid), S stores the message in its buffer with Store-
Buffer(Receiver, “Delete Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id, user-id, node-
id, valid). Using the message given by FCloud, S creates a Type-2 message and sends it
to E. Note that the corresponding “Delete Node” message has already been buffered
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in FCloud, which means that FCloud and FCompute are in the same consistent state.
When E hands back control to the OpenStack Services, the Identity service pro-
vides the validation result in the Type-3 format. This message is leaked through
FSMT to E.
For S to create Type-3 message, it needs the validation result, which already exists
in its buffer. Therefore, the simulator responds to E with a Type-3 message based
on the validation result that has been stored in its buffer.
Upon getting the control back from E, the node is deleted (if it exists) by Compute
service and the result message (Type-4) is leaked to E through FExtNet.
However, in the ideal cloud, the node has not been deleted yet, this is why the
simulator sends FCloud a message of the form (“Delete Node”, session-id, Continue).
Upon receiving the reply from FCloud of the form (“Delete Node”, session-id, Node-
Exist), S updates the buffer with the node existence information. Note that S does
not send the node existence information, but uses it together with valid value to
create Type-4 message. S sets “result” as “Success” if the buffered variables Valid
= True and NodeExist = True, and sets as “Fail” otherwise. Then S creates Type-4
message and sends it to E.
When E hands back the control to the OpenStack Services, the user then receives
the result message, thus S sends a message to FCloud which enables FCloud to inform
the user with the operation result.
For DeleteNode command, since the messages that leak from the ideal world/S
are the same as the messages that leak from the OpenStack Services, the environment
cannot distinguish between these two worlds.
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4.4.2 Property 2: multi command
In this section we explain how interleaving of two different user-provided commands
maintains our invariant even when the adversary controls the order on intermediate
message passing. More precisely, we analyze the simulator’s actions precisely to verify
that E sees the same view in both worlds even when CreateNode and DeleteNode
requests are interleaved.
In the OpenStack Services world, the DeleteNode command consists of the follow-
ing steps:
1. User sends a “Delete Node” request with a unique session-id and a node-id to
FCompute.
2. FCompute validates that the user has permissions to delete a node by asking
FIdentity.
3. If the user is able to delete the node, FCompute makes sure that the node with
node ID=node-id exists and if so, deletes the node.
4. FCompute notifies the user about the result.
The CreateNode command consists of several steps as follows:
1. User sends a “Create Node” request with a unique session-id and required spec-
ification, such as image-id to FCompute.
2. FCompute validates the user to create a node with the specified specification by
asking FIdentity.
3. If the user is allowed to create the node –the validation result is true, then
FCompute requests the corresponding image of image-id from FImage.
110
4. FImage validates the user’s permissions to extract the image corresponding to
image-id by asking FIdentity. It sends the result to FCompute.
5. If the user is allowed to get the corresponding image of image-id, FCompute
requests a node-id from adversary.
6. Adversary provides a node-id.
7. FCompute makes sure that the node-id is not used, if so, creates a node using the
corresponding image and the specification and assigns the node-id to it.
8. FCompute notifies the user about the result.
We emphasize the following properties of the two processes. First, the DeleteNode
process shows that the node-id is evaluated only after FCompute is sure that the user is
allowed to delete the node and that the node exists. Second, the CreateNode process
permits the node to be created only after step 6 in which the adversary provides the
node-id.
Let’s consider the situation in which the user first runs the DeleteNode command
for node-id =2 (which exists) then requests to “create a node” in which the adversary
provides node-id =2 (in step 6 of the CreateNode command). We argue that, based
on how the adversary may control the order of the intermediate messages, the result
and E’s view of these two commands in both worlds (OpenStack Services and ideal
world) are the same and the simulator may never get to an undefined state. Note that
the result may be different based on the adversarially-chosen order of intermediate
messages, but the point here is that the two worlds provide the same result for each
possible message ordering.
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In the OpenStack Services, if the requests are done in the given order, the node
with node-id =2 should be deleted first and a new node with node-id =2 be created
next. However, if the adversary prevents the delete node to be deleted and lets the
create node complete first, then the node wouldn’t be created because the node-id
=2 is being used.
The simulator should also be able to act in the same way while not getting into
an unexpected state. Note that validation of the user credentials and access list of
one command doesn’t affect the result of any other command. Therefore, we divide
the CreateNode process into two phases.
Phase 1: Before getting node-id from the adversary (steps 1-5).
Phase 2: Getting node-id from the adversary and after that (steps 6-8). Note that
in these steps, FCompute executes without interruption from the adversary (or
anyone else).
Phase 1 only deals with validation and getting corresponding image of image-id.
During this phase, the ideal cloud provides the corresponding information by sending
one of these two messages:
Type-A: (Receiver, “Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Corresponding-
Image) for the case where the user is able to create a node and get the corre-
sponding image related to image-id or
Type-B: (Receiver, “Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, reason) for the case
where the act of creating a node fails for reason = “user is not valid to create
a node” or “user is not valid to get image related to image-id ”.
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If S has received a Type-B message from the cloud, the CreateNode command
has failed due to invalid user permissions. In this case, any ordering of CreateNode
and DeleteNode may not result into unexpected state for S because the validation
messages have no effect on the result of any other message.
When the simulator receives a Type-A message, then the user is authorized to
create a node and get the image related to image-id. Therefore, if all intermediate
messages of Phase 1 are sent, then the simulator can ask E for a node-id (which is
the beginning of Phase 2 ).
If S receives a Type-A message, then the adversary can interleave messages in one
of two ways:
1. The adversary might allow the DeleteNode command be completed before Phase
2 of CreateNode command. In this case, the adversary has not given a node-id
and thus the ideal cloud has not examined the usage of that node-id. Therefore,
if the given node-id exists and the user is allowed to delete a node, the DeleteN-
ode command will be done successfully and the create node can be completed
with the same node-id.
2. The adversary might allow Phase 2 of the CreateNode command to be com-
pleted before the DeleteNode command. In this case, the simulator has received
the node-id for creating a node from the adversary. S then passes this message
immediately to the cloud. At this state, the ideal cloud examines the node
usage and if it is used (which in our case it is true) then the result of create
node will be “Fail” but the node is able to be deleted next.
In summary: while the adversary’s choice of ordering messages can influence the final
state, in both circumstances the outcome is identical in the OpenStack Services and
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ideal cloud, which means that E’s view must also be identical in both worlds. In
particular, the simulator never reaches a state that is not defined by the services, and
the execution of its commands yields the same result as the OpenStack Services when
the adversary controls the message ordering.
4.4.3 Property 3: service compromise
In this section, our aim is to showcase how the simulator acts when having a com-
promised service such that the environment E sees the same view in both worlds.
Note that when a service is compromised, no matter which token mechanism is
used, the adversary can do anything within the service’s authority. Meanwhile, deal-
ing with another service (when one of them is compromised) is not possible without
using a token mechanism. Using the compromised service’s capabilities, the adver-
sary may try to deceive an uncompromised-service to get more information. In order
to make this happen the adversary needs to send a legitimate token with its request
while dealing with service-to-service interaction. This is where the difference in secu-
rity provided between the bearer token and the forthcoming, stronger one-time token
model in Chapters 5 and 6 can be demonstrated. For this reason, we will focus more
on the service-to-service interactions and show how the simulator acts per each token
models such that the environment E gets the same view in both worlds. We exem-
plify this scenario by discussing the case in which the adversary has compromised
only Nova and is trying to get as much information as possible from Glance (Image
service).
We illustrate Property 3 with Nova as the compromised service because several
bearer tokens pass through Nova that are intended for different services. Ergo, a
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compromised Nova offers a representative case study for capturing the amount of
damage that an active adversary can do; any other service-to-service interaction in-
volves comparable or simpler reasoning.
In general, when Nova is compromised, the adversary gets access to credentials
corresponding to the following:
• Any actions that users make of FCompute while it is compromised.
• Any actions that users requested of FCompute before it was compromised but
that remained unfulfilled before the compromise.
Recall that in the ideal world there are no credentials; ergo, it is the simulator’s
responsibility to create, store, and track any compromised credentials as needed so
that E sees the same result from both worlds for both models. We have to stress that
this property provides us with the level of security that OpenStack provides in the
case of service corruption. Below, we consider the simulator’s responsibility in bearer
token model.
Property 3 in the bearer token model The bearer token has two properties:
1- Unscoped, 2- No limitation on the number of usage. In the OpenStack Services,
because of the first property, the adversary may make different requests to different
services using the compromised service and user-id. And because of the second prop-
erty, the adversary may use the compromised user-id and send a request to a service
more than once.
The simulator should represent these properties in any condition, specially when
a service is compromised, such that the environment E gets the same view from both
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worlds. To realize these properties, the simulator creates a credential per each com-
promised user (user-id). That is, when Nova is compromised, the simulator notifies
the ideal cloud and the ideal cloud sends all user-id that have made either a new re-
quest or have an unfinalized request while Nova was corrupted. Then, the simulator
creates a unique credential for each user-id, stores it in its database for future use,
and adds these credentials to the corresponding messages as needed. Having these
credentials however, the simulator is not able to respond to the adversarial validation
request for a compromised user-id because in this case the simulator does not know
if the credential is still valid.
As an example, let’s consider that Nova is compromised while user with user-id
=5 has uncompleted request and this user is able to have access to images related
to image-id =2,10. In this situation, if the adversary/E makes the following request
to Glance (in the openstack world): ”GetImage with image-id =2 for user-id =5”,
then Glance sends a request to Identity to validate user access and receives back
the response. Based on the validation result, Glance provides the corresponding
image to Compute. In the ideal world, the simulator is responsible to create these
intermediate messages. Simulator has answer to neither Glance’s validation request
nor image, therefore it should ask the ideal cloud.
The simulator first makes sure that the user credential related to user-id =5 is
correct by comparing it with the information in its database, then sends a request to
the ideal cloud to get the validation result and the image related to the image-id =2.
Based on the ideal cloud’s response, the simulator creates the corresponding messages
and sends it to E.
Because of ”unlimited time of use” property that the bearer token has, the adver-
sary is able to repeat this request at any time. Which means all image information
116
associated with image-id =2 for the rest of time should be considered compromised.
In addition, due to the unscoped property, the simulator only stores a credential per
user-id and therefore, the adversary is able to make another request to Glance to
extract the image related to image-id =10 successfully (if s/he uses the same creden-
tial). Hence, E’s view will be identical in both worlds while using the bearer token
mechanism.
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Chapter 5
Improved Tokening Mechanism
Our analysis in Chapter 4 has shown that the simulator of the ideal cloud cannot
emulate the corrupted services unless we relax the security promises of the ideal
cloud . To a large extent, these concerns arise due to the use of bearer tokens, which
enable anyone who can see a token to masquerade as corresponding user and perform
any action allowed to the owner of the token on behalf of him. Bearer-tokens are
leaked to the adversary in both partially and fully corrupted services which could
happen through a vulnerability. Once a service corrupted, it could be malicious in at
least two important ways:
• A service can use a token to obtain unrequested services charged to the user.
• A service can use a token to access other resources at another service (like
exporting a disk with sensitive information).
The above problems are not tolerated by the cloud users. Having a bug free cloud
is not realistic, but reducing effects of buggy code is possible. Therefore, it is desired
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to have OpenStack guarantee the modularity security requirement defined as follows:
Definition 1. Modularity Security Requirement : If an adversary corrupts a service,
other services just do whatever requested to do by the users, nothing more. For
example, if an adversary corrupts the Image service, he cannot create or delete a
node, but if a user issues a “create node” command, it is possible to create a node
with a corrupted image because of the image service corruption.
We propose to limit the impact of service corruption by preventing replay attacks
and scoping tokens only to handle the request desired by the user by following an
idea laid out in [56, 18]: building tokens that can only be used once.
5.0.1 One-Time Tokens
Within the OpenStack services, we modify all uses of tokens so that each token may
only be used to perform a single request requested by the user (even if this request
necessitates action by many services). Specifically, we modify Keystone to sign tokens
that have been scoped by the user (and potentially scoped further down as it is passed
from one service to the next) and also to maintain a blacklist of all redeemed tokens.
A one-time use token scoped to a specific job resembles a “ticket” as used in Kerberos
[52] or in TLS 1.3’s zero round trip time mechanism [32].
Restricting tokens to be single use with specific parameters limits the capability of
the adversary to misuse tokens that he captures by corrupting a service. Previously a
corrupted service could store all tokens it sees and use them at will. This modification
ensures that once a token has been used it will not be accepted again in the future.
Additionally, since tokens are scoped, it is not possible for a corrupted service to lie
to uncorrupted services about the content of a user’s request. Specifically, users will
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indicate when requesting a token exactly which of their resources it grants access to.
This would not prevent a corrupted Compute from deleting a node when a user had
asked to create one or creating a node with a completely different specification since
Compute could simply do these things without bothering to verify the token, but
it would prevent Compute from requesting a different image from the Image service
than the one the user had intended. This helps in the case where the adversary has
not already seen, via a request by a different user, the image it would like to have
Compute use. Scoped, single use tokens even benefit functionalities that go beyond
those captured in our model; for example, an adversary who corrupts a VM is not
able to bring down the cloud by observing user tokens in Nova message queue (this
issue was discussed in [56]). We also remark that there is another notion of limited-
use tokens with a security-performance tradeoff. Many OpenStack engineers desire
a stateless Keystone architecture in order to distribute the authentication process
over several servers for improved scalability and performance. If it is desirable to
keep Keystone stateless, then one could instead design “limited-reuse” tokens with
a short lifetime. While one could model the impacts of limited reuse by combining
rate limiting with a UC model of network time [15], in this thesis we focus on the
One-Time token presented above with an explicit blacklist to prevent reuse.
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Chapter 6
UC Analysis of OpenStack with
Improved Tokening Mechanism
In this chapter we aim to analyze the security of the strengthened version of Open-
Stack (with improved one-time token mechanism) in the universal composability set-
ting. Particularly, we want to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The strengthened version of OpenStack Services using a one-time token
securely realizes the less-leaky ideal cloud FCloud OneTime in the (FExtNet, FSMT)-hybrid
model.
For this reason, we need to formaly specify the ideal cloud and strengthened
version of OpenStack Service in UC syntax, provide a simulator, and analyze that
the simulator works to insure that the views of the environment is the same in both
worlds. The rest of this chapter covers these purposes.
Note that all description and assumptions made in section 3.2 hold for these
algorithms.
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6.1 Ideal Cloud Functionality Using One-Time To-
kens
We provide the ideal cloud functionality for the scenario with improved tokens in
Algorithm 21. Table 6.1 illustrates the extra interfaces that are needed to preserve
the indistinguishably between the ideal cloud and the OpenStack Service world when
using one-time token. The main differences between this ideal cloud and the ideal
cloud for the bearer token (section 4.1) are the following two parts:
• No need for the extra interface (line codes 220-228 of Algorithm 8) to respond
to validation request from a corrupted service to identity. Thank to the scoped
one-time token, simulator can respond to this type of requests without asking
the ideal cloud.
• More restricted interface (compared to line code 271-285 of Algorithm 8) for
the case that the compute service is corrupted and makes a request to image
service. In the ideal cloud for bearer token (section 4.1), whenever a user gets
corrupted, the compute service may make as many requests as it wants on of
behalf of the users to get images from image service. But the ideal cloud for
one-time token checks whether the user has made the create node request and
has specified the image-id in its request. This limits the attackers ability to
gain more information when it gets access to a user’s credential.
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Table 6.1: Added interfaces to the ideal cloud for corrupted services in Algorithm 21
Code Line Description
54-56 For corrupted node, if the adversary asked for execution, then the
ideal cloud will execute the given activity.
93-95 For corrupt identity, adversary may provide arbitrary validation re-
sult which ideal cloud needs to know in order to make the correct
decisions.
100-106 For corrupted computer or node, the adversary may provide arbi-
trary node-id to attach a volume to it. For corrupted storage or
volume, the adversary may provide arbitrary volume-id to attach a
node to it.
140-142 For corrupted identity, the adversary may provide arbitrary valida-
tion result.
147-154 For corrupted computer or node, the adversary may provide arbi-
trary node-id to detach a volume from it. For corrupted storage or
volume, the adversary may provide arbitrary volume-id to detach a
node from it.
177-181 For corrupted compute, the ideal cloud will apply any request which
this service can handle, without any validation check.
183-186 For corrupted compute, the adversary may request to output a delete
node result to the user.
188-200 For corrupted identity, the adversary may provide arbitrary valida-
tion result which to a request to delete node.
232-235 For corrupted compute, the adversary may ask the service to output
a create node result.
237-247 For corrupted image, the adversary may provide arbitrary image
when a user makes a create node request. The ideal cloud will use
this arbitrary image to create a node for the user.
249-263 For corrupted compute, if the adversary sends a request on behalf
of compute service to image service and make a request to get an
image with an image-id which is not in the original user’s request
(for create node), then the request will fail.
265- 274 For corrupted identity, the ideal cloud will create node if the user has
made create node request and the adversary has set all the validation
results as true.
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Algorithm 21 Ideal Cloud for One-Time Token
1: function Cloud OneTime Token
2: Upon receiving (”Corrupt”, Service, value) from SimOT:
3: Corrupt[Service]=value; % the default value=None. None indicates no cor-
ruption; Passive is the partial corruption, and Active is the full corruption
4: if Service=FImage & value!=None then
5: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
6: Add (user-id) to the List;
7: end if
8: send-SimOT(DB of (image-id, corresponding-Image),List of (user-id));
9: else if Service=FCompute & value!=None then
10: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
11: Add (user-id) to the List;
12: Send-SimOT(List of (user-id));
13: end if
14: else if Service=FIdentity & value!=None then
15: Send-SimOT(DB of (user-id, roles));
16: else if Service=FBlockStorage & value!=None then
17: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
18: Add (user-id) to the List;
19: end if
20: Send-SimOT(List of (user-id));
21: else if Service=FNodenode-id & value!=None then
22: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
23: Add (user-id) to the List;
24: end if
25: Send-SimOT(List of (user-id));
26: else if Service=FVolumevolume-id & value!=None then
27: if there are user requests that have not finalized then
28: Add (user-id) to the List;
29: end if
30: Send-SimOT(List of (user-id));
31: end if
32:
33: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity) from user U:
34: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
35: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity);
36: end if
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37: Send-SimOT (Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity);
38:
39: Upon receiving(”Result Access Node”, session-id) from SimOT:
40: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Reques-
tActivity, valid) then
41: if valid=True then
42: results ← Execute(AccessRequest);
43: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
RequestActivity, valid}, {Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
result, valid});
44: Send-SimOT (”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, result,
valid);
45: end if
46: end if
47:
48: Upon receiving(”Output Access Node”, session-id) from SimOT:
49: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, results,
valid) then
50: RemoveBuffer(”Access Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, results, valid);
51: Output(”Access Node”, session-id, results, valid) to Receiver ;
52: end if
53: Upon receiving (”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity) from
SimOT:
54: if Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
55: results ← Execute(AccessRequest);
56: else
57: results = None
58: end if
59: Send-SimOT(”Access Node”, session-id, node-id, RequestActivity, results)
60:
61: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) from user U;
62: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
63: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id);
64: end if
65: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
66:
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67: Upon receiving (”Result Attach Volume”, session-id) from SimOT:
68: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id, valid) then
69: if valid=True & attached-volume for node node-id is None & attached-
node for volume volume-id is None then
70: Set attached-volume for node node-id to volume-id
71: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to node-id
72: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-
id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, successful })
73: Send-SimOT(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success-
ful)
74: else
75: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-
id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, Fail) })
76: Send-SimOT(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, Fail)
77: end if
78: end if
79:
80: Upon receiving (”Output Attach Volume”, session-id) from SimOT:
81: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id, result) then
82: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, result)
83: Output(”Attach Volume”, session-id, result) to Receiver
84: end if
85:
86: Upon Receiving (Confirm, ”Attach Volume” session-id, valid)
87: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
88: if user user-id is allowed to attach volume-id to node-id for session session-
id then
89: valid=True
90: else
91: valid=False
92: end if
93: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
94: valid = value sent by SimOT
95: end if
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96: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id }, {Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid })
97: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid)
98: end if
99:
100: Upon receiving (”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id) from
SimOT;
101: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
102: Set attached-volume for node node-id to volume-id
103: end if
104: if Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active” then
105: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to node-id
106: end if
107: Send-SimOT (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
108:
109: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) from user U;
110: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
111: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id);
112: end if
113: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
114:
115: Upon receiving (”Result Detach Volume”, session-id) from SimOT:
116: result= Fail;
117: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, valid) then
118: if valid=True & attached-volume for node node-id is volume-id &
attached-node for volume volume-id is node-id then
119: Set attached-volume for node node-id to None
120: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to None
121: result= Successful;
122: end if
123: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-
id, node-id, valid) }, {Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, result })
124: Send-SimOT(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, result)
125: end if
126:
127
127: Upon receiving (”Output Detach Volume”, session-id) from SimOT:
128: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, result) then
129: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id, result)
130: Output(”Detach Volume”, session-id, result) to Receiver
131: end if
132:
133: Upon Receiving (Confirm, ”Detach Volume” session-id, valid);
134: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id) then
135: if user user-id is allowed to detach volume-id from node-id session session-
id then
136: valid=True
137: else
138: valid=False
139: end if
140: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
141: valid = value sent by SimOT
142: end if
143: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id,
node-id }, {Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid })
144: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id,
valid)
145: end if
146:
147: Upon receiving (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id) from
SimOT;
148: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
149: Set attached-volume for node node-id to None
150: end if
151: if Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” or Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active” then
152: Set attached-node for volume volume-id to None
153: end if
154: Send-SimOT (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id);
155:
156: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, ServiceObject-List) from U:
157: if Corrupt[Compute]!=”Active” then
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158: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
159: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure);
160: end if
161: end if
162: Send-SimOT (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, ServiceObject-List);
163:
164: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output”, session-id) from SimOT:
165: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, node-id, valid)
then
166: Output(”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
167: end if
168:
169: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, user-id) from
user U:
170: if Corrupt[Compute]!=”Active” then
171: if session-id =(U,N) where N non-repetitive for user U then
172: StoreBuffer (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
173: end if
174: end if
175: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
176:
177: Upon receiving (”MainComputeCorrupt”, request) from SimOT:
178: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
179: Apply the request;
180: Send-SimOT(”MainComputeCorruptResult”,result);
181: end if
182:
183: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) from
SimOT:
184: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” or Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
185: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
186: end if
187:
188: Upon receiving (”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) from SimOT:
189: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) & Cor-
rupt[Identity]=”Active” then
190: if valid= True then
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191: if node node-id exists then
192: NodeExist= True;
193: Delete node with node-id;
194: else
195: NodeExist= False
196: end if
197: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
198: Send-SimOT (Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist);
199: end if
200: end if
201:
202: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from SimOT:
203: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure) then
204: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to create node using Node-Structure
for this session-id then
205: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
206: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Node-Structure})
207: Send-SimOT (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”);
208: else
209: if user-id is allowed to create node with image-id with Node-
Structure & there exists image-id then
210: Corresponding-Image=get the image corresponding to image-
id;
211: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image});
212: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image);
213: else
214: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id,
NULL, Fail});
215: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail,
reason=”Get Image”, Node-Structure);
216: end if
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217: end if
218: else
219: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure},{Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, NULL, Fail});
220: Send-SimOT(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Create Node”, Node-Structure);
221: end if
222: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) then
223: if user-id is valid & user-id is allowed to delete node node-id then
224: Valid= True;
225: else
226: Valid= False;
227: end if
228: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id
},{Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid});
229: Send-SimOT (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
Valid);
230: end if
231:
232: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node result”, session-id, node-id, valid)
from SimOT:
233: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
234: Output (”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
235: end if
236:
237: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”,Corresponding-Image, node-id) from SimOT:
238: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-
id, user-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Node-Structure) then
239: if node-id is not used then
240: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Node-Structure}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Successful});
241: Add (node-id, user-id, Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure) to the
list of active nodes;
242: Send-SimOT(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, successful);
243: else
244: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure,, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Fail});
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245: Send-SimOT(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Fail);
246: end if
247: end if
248:
249: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id) from SimOT:
250: valid= False;
251: Corresponding-Image=NULL;
252: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & user-id is valid & user-id has requested for
this image-id in this session-id then
253: valid= True;
254: if image image-id exists then
255: Corresponding-Image= extract corresponding image of image-id;
256: end if
257: Send-SimOT(”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Corresponding-
Image, valid);
258: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
259: if image image-id exists then
260: Corresponding-Image= extract corresponding image of image-id;
261: end if
262: Send-SimOT(”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image);
263: end if
264:
265: Upon receiving (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id, Corresponding-Image) from
SimOT:
266: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
267: result= Fail;
268: if node-id is not used then
269: Add( node-id, user-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image) to the
list of active nodes;
270: result= Successful;
271: end if
272: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue, session-id, node-id, result});
273: Send-SimOT(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, result);
274: end if
275:
276: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output valid”, session-id, valid) from SimOT:
277: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
278: if valid= False then
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279: Output(”Create Node”, session-id, NULL, Fail) to Receiver ;
280: end if
281: end if
282:
283: Upon receiving (”Delete Node”, session-id, Continue) from SimOT:
284: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid)
then
285: if there is node with node-id then
286: NodeExist= True;
287: else
288: NodeExist= False;
289: end if
290: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
Valid}, {Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid, NodeEx-
ist});
291: if Valid= True & NodeExist= True then
292: Delete node-id from the Node list;
293: end if
294: Send-SimOT (”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, Valid, NodeExist);
295: end if
296:
297: Upon receiving (”Output Delete Node”, session-id) from SimOT:
298: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Valid,
NodeExist) then
299: if NodeExist= False or Valid= False then
300: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail) to Receiver ;
301: else
302: Output(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Successful) to Receiver ;
303: end if
304: end if
305: Upon receiving (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id) from SimOT:
306: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Corresponding-Image) then
307: node-struct=Node-Structure;
308: if node-id is not used then
309: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Successful});
310: Add (node-id, user-id, Corresponding-Image, Node-Structure) to the
list of active nodes;
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311: Send-SimOT(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, successful);
312: else
313: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure,, Corresponding-Image}, {Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”,
session-id, node-id, Fail});
314: Send-SimOT(”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, Fail);
315: end if
316: end if
317:
318: Upon receiving (”Create Node Output”, session-id) from SimOT:
319: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Continue”, session-id, node-id, valid)
then
320: Output(”Create Node”, session-id, node-id, valid) to Receiver ;
321: end if
322: end function
6.1.1 OpenStack Services Functionalities Using One-Time To-
kens
In the case of using One-time token, only Algorithm 10 and 25 are slightly changed.
The new dashboard algorithm (Algorithm 22) creates one-time token credential per
each request and adds it to the message before forwarding to the destination service.
The new identity algorithm (Algorithm 23) needs to make sure that the request is
in the scope of the one-time token. It then adds the service (that made the validation
request) to the session-id blacklist until the expiration of the one-time token.
134
Algorithm 22 Dashboard for one-time token
1: function Dashboard
2:
3: Upon receiving Request-Message from Env:% The request-message also con-
tains the expiration date and other information that are needed for the one-time
Token
4: Creates one-time token creds for the specific request with time and resource
limitation based on the Request-Message and user keys;
5: Request-Message=Remove extra information that were needed to create one-
time token from Request-Message;
6: User U Creates (UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds);
7: Send-FExtNet(UDashboard, FService, Request-Message, creds);
8:
9: Upon receiving (Sender, Output-Message) from FExtNet:
10: Output (Output-Message) to Env;
11: end function
Algorithm 23 Identity for one-time token
1: function Corrupt
2: Upon receiving (“Corrupt”, Corrupt-Code) from Adv:
3: Replace code of FIdentity with code of Corrupted FIdentity
4: end function
5: function ServiceValidation % FIdentity removes the black list of the expired
tokens;
6: Upon receiving (Receiver, “Service Validation”, session-id, credsservice, creds,
Request) from FSMT:
7: if credsservice & creds are valid & creds is allowed to perform the Request
then % here the validation means: 1) Makes sure that the token is legitimate
2) The token is not expired 3) This service needs to take action but is not in
BlackListsession-id.
8: Add the service to BlackListsession-id;
9: valid= True;
10: else
11: valid= False;
12: end if
13: Send-FSMT (FIdentity, Receiver, “Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, service-
id, Request, valid);
14: end function
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6.1.2 Simulator for Ideal Cloud with One-Time Tokens
The simulator S for the ideal cloud using one-time token mechanism is given in
Algorithm 24. This simulator is more stringent than the simulator using bearer token
model (Algorithm 20).
To enforce the single-use constraint, S creates a black list to store the services that
have already checked the validity of a credential using session-id; the simulator then
rejects all future attempts to validate the same credential. To enforce the scoping
constraint, S only issues credentials when given both an session-id and a request
scope; the simulator records this intended scope and subsequently rejects all attempts
to validate the credential in pursuit of a request outside of this scope.
Algorithm 24 Simulator with One-time token
1: function Simulator OneTime Token(message)
2:
3: Upon receiving (”Corrupt”, Service,value) from Env:
4: Corrupt[Service]=value; %value=passive or Active. For passive corruption,
there would be no changes in the ideal cloud functionality. However, the simulator
leaks the credentials of the users when a message is sent or received by a corrupted
service. For this reason, only the credential should be added to the message (which
is ignored in this code).
5: Fetch Buffer and find all session-id which are not finalized when corruption
happens and create unique Credential per each, then update BufferRequest with
the new credential and set corruption value to ”corrupt”;
6: if FindServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id, credsservice) & credsservice =NULL
then
7: Credential= Generate credential for the service;
8: credsservice =Credential;
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9: UpdateServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id, credsservice);
10: end if
11: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Corrupt”, Service, value);
12: Upon receiving (DB of (image-id, corresponding-Image) from IdealCloudOT:
13: StoreDB (All (image-id, corresponding-Image));
14:
15: Upon receiving (List of active nodes) from IdealCloudOT:
16: StoreDB (active nodes);
17: Upon receiving (Sender, Receiver, message) from Env:
18: if Receiver=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
19: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
20: else if Receiver=FIdentity & Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
21: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
22: else if Receiver=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
23: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
24: else if Receiver=FBlockStorage & Corrupt[Storage]=”Active” then
25: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
26: else if Receiver=FNodenode-id & Corrupt[Node node-id ]=”Active” then
27: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
28: else if Receiver=FVolumevolume-id & Corrupt[Volume volume-id ]=”Active”
then
29: Send-Env(Sender, Adversary, message);
30: end if
31:
32: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
Cloud:
33: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
34: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
35:
36: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
37: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
38: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
39:
40: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
41: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
42: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
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43: Upon Receiving(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
44: StoreBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
45: Send-Env (FIdentity, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
46:
47: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, node-id,
RequestActivity) from Env:
48: Send-IdealCloudOT(Adversary, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, node-id, Re-
questActivity)
49:
50: Upon Receiving (”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
51: if (Compute is Corrupt OR Node node-id is Corrupt) AND (Storage is Cor-
rupt OR Volume volume-id is Corrupt) then
52: Send-Env(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
53: else
54: Send-Env(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
55: end if
56:
57: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
Cloud:
58: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
59: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, user-id, node-id)
60:
61: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
62: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
63: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
64:
65: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
66: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
67: Send-Env (FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
68:
69: Upon Receiving(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
70: StoreBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
71: Send-Env (FIdentity, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
72:
73: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, node-id,
RequestActivity) from Env:
74: Send-IdealCloudOT(Adversary, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, node-id, Re-
questActivity)
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75: Upon Receiving (”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id)
76: if (Compute is Corrupt OR Node node-id is Corrupt) OR (Storage is Corrupt
OR Volume volume-id is Corrupt) then
77: Send-Env(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, success)
78: else
79: Send-Env(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, failure)
80: end if
81:
82: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, ServiceObject-List) from IdealCloudOT:
83: StoreDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, NULL, ServiceObject-List,
NULL, NULL);
84: StoreBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure);
85: Send-Env(Receiver, FCompute, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure, ServiceObject-List);
86:
87: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, request) from Env:
88: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
89: Send-IdealCloudOT(”MainComputeCorrupt”, request);
90: end if
91:
92: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, Corresponding-Image, valid) from
IdealCloudOT:
93: if FindBuffer(”Result”, Service, destination, message) with request-
ID=session-id then
94: UpdateBuffer({”Result”, FService, destination, message}, {FImage, FCompute,
”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid});
95: StoreDB(image-id, Corresponding-Image);% if this image is not stored in
the SimOT DB, then store it.
96: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, FImage-id,
user-id, ”Get Image image-id ”);
97: end if
98:
99: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, ”Corrupted Get
Image”) from IdealCloudOT:
100: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”);
101: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node”);
102:
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103: Upon receiving (”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-Image)
from IdealCloudOT:
104: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Im-
age result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid) then
105: if Corresponding-Image=NULL then
106: valid= False;
107: else
108: valid= True;
109: end if
110: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid});
111: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-id, image-id, ,
Corresponding-Image);
112: end if
113:
114: Upon receiving (”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, valid) from
IdealCloudOT:
115: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id) then
116: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Create Node Output”, session-id })
117: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid)
118: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid,node-id) then
119: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver,”Create Node node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid,node-id },{Receiver, ”Cre-
ate Node Output”, session-id });
120: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
121: end if
122:
123: Upon receiving (Adversary, FCompute, ”Node ID”, session-id, node-id) from
Env:
124: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” & FindBuffer (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image) then
125: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Node ID continue”,
session-id, node-id });
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126: Send-IdealCloudOT (Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image, node-id);
127: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node get
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid) then
128: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node get node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node
node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image,
valid,node-id })
129: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Node ID”, session-id, node-id, Corresponding-
Image);
130: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Request NodeID”, session-id) then
131: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Request NodeID”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id })
132: Send-IdealCloudOT (”Node ID”, session-id, node-id);
133: end if
134:
135: Upon receiving (Adversary, Receiver, ”Forward”, message, destination) from
Env:
136: if Receiver=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
137: if Destination is not a service then
138: StoreBuffer(”Output”, FCompute, destination, message);
139: else
140: StoreBuffer(FCompute, destination, message);
141: end if
142: Send-Env(FCompute, destination, message);
143: else if Receiver=FIdentity & Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
144: if destination=FCompute & Request=”Delete Node” & message is ”Ser-
vice Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”,
session-id, user-id, node-id) then
145: extract the valid value from the message;
146: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id }, {Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid});
147: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
148: else if destination=FCompute & Request=”Create Node with Node-
Structure” & message is ”Service Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create
Node validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure) then
149: extract the valid value from the message;
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150: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure}, {Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
151: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
152: else if destination=FImage & Request=”Get Image image-id ” & mes-
sage is ”Service Validated” type & FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
153: extract the Image-valid value from the message;
154: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validated”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid}, {Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid});
155: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
156: else
157: StoreBuffer(FIdentity, destination, message);
158: Send-Env(FIdentity, destination, message);
159: end if
160: else if Receiver=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
161: if destination= FCompute & message=(”Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image ) & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) where the message session-ID=session-
id then
162: UpdateBuffer ({Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image});
163: else
164: StoreBuffer(FImage, destination, message);
165: end if
166: Send-Env(FImage, destination, message);
167: end if
168:
169: Upon receiving (Adversary, FImage, ”Get Image”, image-id) from Env:
170: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
171: if image-id exist then
172: Corresponding-Image= extract the corresponding image for image-id;
173: else
174: Corresponding-Image= NULL;
175: end if
176: Send-Env (FImage, Adversary, ”Image”, image-id, Corresponding-Image );
177: end if
178:
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179: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) from
IdealCloudOT:
180: StoreDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, NULL, ServiceObject-List,
NULL, NULL);
181: StoreBuffer(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id);
182: Send-Env(Receiver, FCompute, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, user-id);
183:
184: Upon receiving (”MainComputeCorruptResult”, result) from IdealCloudOT:
185: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, result);
186:
187: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist) from IdealCloudOT:
188: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid, NodeExist);
189: if valid= True & NodeExist= True then
190: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, success-
ful );
191: else
192: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Fail );
193: end if
194:
195: Upon receiving (”Confirm”, session-id) from Env:
196: if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure) then
197: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
198: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
199: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
200: else
201: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
202: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
203: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
204: end if
205: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Create Node”, session-id, creds,
image-id, Node-Structure);
206: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
207: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
Node-Structure},{Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure});
208: Request=”Create Node with Node-Structure”;
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209: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Service-
id, user-id, Request, ServiceObject-List);
210: else if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
211: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Confirm”, session-id);
212: else
213: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Confirm”, session-id);
214: end if
215: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure) then
216: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
217: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
218: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
219: else
220: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
221: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
222: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
223: end if
224: Extract credsservice from ServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id,
credsservice) where Service=FCompute;
225: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node validation”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure},{Receiver,”Create Node validated”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure});
226: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, ”Service validation, session-id,
credsservice, creds, Request);
227: end if
228: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Node-Structure, valid) then
229: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
230: if valid= False then
231: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node result continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
232: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
233: else
234: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
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235: Send-Env(FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-
id);
236: end if
237: end if
238: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node result continue”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
239: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Create Node Output valid”, session-id, Fail);
240: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
241: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
242: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, compute-id,
user-id, Request=”Get Image image-id ”);
243: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid) then
244: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
245: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
246: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
247: else
248: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
249: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
250: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
251: end if
252: Extract credsservice from ServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id,
credsservice) where Service=FImage;
253: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image validation”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get Image
validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, valid});
254: Send-Env (FImage, Adversary, ”Service validation, session-id,
credsservice, creds, Request=”Get Image image-id ”);
255: end if
256: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid) then
257: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
258: if Image-valid= False then
259: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid}, {Receiver,”Create Node re-
sult continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Fail});
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260: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
261: else
262: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid},{Receiver,”Create Node Get
Image result”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Image-valid});
263: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Get Image”, session-id,user-id, image-id);
264: end if
265: end if
266: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid) then
267: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & valid= False then
268: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},
{Receiver,”Create Node result continue”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Fail});
269: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, NULL, Fail);
270: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” & valid= True then
271: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Create Node Get Image continue”,
session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid},
{Receiver,”Create Node get node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Corresponding-Image, valid});
272: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
273: end if
274: else if FindBuffer(FCompute, destination, message) where the request-ID in
the message is equal to session-id then
275: if destination=FIdentity then
276: if Corrupt[Identity] !=”Active” then
277: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Credential, ServiceObject-List,
Black-List) where request-ID=session-id & Credential=creds & (FCompute,Object)
∈ ServiceObject-List & FCompute /∈ Black-List then
278: AddBlack-Listsession-id(FCompute);
279: valid=successful;
280: else
281: valid=fail;
282: end if
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283: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message},
{Receiver=destination, Sender= FCompute, ”Service validated”, session-id,
Request, valid});
284: Send-Env(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, Request, valid);
285: else
286: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);% adversary can either
forward a message or make a create/delete node request.
287: end if
288: else if destination=FImage then
289: if Corrupt[Image] !=”Active” then
290: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Credential, ServiceObject-List,
Black-List) where request-ID=session-id & Credential=creds & (FImage,image-id)
∈ ServiceObject-List & FImage /∈ Black-List then
291: extract user-id from the message;
292: Message= message that the user credential is replaced by user-
id;
293: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message},{”Result”,
FCompute, destination, message});
294: Send-IdealCloudOT(Message);
295: else
296: UpdateBuffer({FCompute, destination, message},{FImage,
FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id, NULL, Fail});
297: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
FImage-id, user-id, ”Get Image image-id ”);
298: end if
299: else
300: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);% adversary can either
forward a message or make a create/delete node request.
301: end if
302: end if
303: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, session-id, Request,
valid) then
304: if Sender=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
305: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, message);
306: else if Sender=FImage & Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
307: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, message);
308: end if
309: else if FindBuffer(FImage, destination, message) where the session-ID in the
message is equal to session-id then
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310: if destination= FCompute & message=(”Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image ) & FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-
id, user-id, image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) where the message request-
ID=session-id then
311: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Node ID”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”, Corresponding-Image});
312: RemoveBuffer(FImage, destination, message);
313: Send-Env (FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
314: else if destination=FIdentity then
315: if Corrupt[Identity] !=”Active” then
316: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Credential, ServiceObject-List,
Black-List) where request-ID=session-id & Credential=creds & (FImage,Object)
∈ ServiceObject-List & FImage /∈ Black-List then
317: AddBlack-Listsession-id(FImage);
318: valid=successful;
319: else
320: valid=fail;
321: end if
322: StoreBuffer(Receiver=destination, Sender= FImage, ”Service vali-
dated”, session-id, Request, valid);
323: Send-Env(Receiver, Sender, ”Service validated”, Request, valid);
324: else
325: Send-Env(FImage, Adversary, message);
326: end if
327: end if
328: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
329: AddBlack-Listsession-id(FImage);
330: UpdateBuffer({FImage, FCompute, ”Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”},{FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-
id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid”});
331: Send-Env (FIdentity, FImage, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request=”Get Image image-id ”, valid);
332: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-id, image-
id, Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
333: UpdateBuffer({FImage, FCompute, ”validated Get Image”, session-id, image-
id, Corresponding-Image, valid”}, {FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-
id, image-id, Corresponding-Image, valid”});
334: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-idimage-id, Corresponding-
Image);
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335: else if FindBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”) then
336: RemoveBuffer(FImage, FCompute, ”Result Get Image”, session-id, image-id,
Corresponding-Image, valid”);
337: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
338: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, message);
339: end if
340: else if FindBuffer(”Output”, Service, destination, message) then
341: UpdateBuffer({”Output”, Service, destination, message},{”Output Con-
tinue”, Service, destination, message})
342: if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message contains
”Delete Node” then
343: Send-Env(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
344: else if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message con-
tains ”Create Node” then
345: Send-Env(Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
346: end if
347: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) then
348: AddBlack-Listsession-id(FCompute);
349: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”},{Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, ”Corrupted Get Image”})
350: Send-Env(FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Compute-id, ”Create Node”, Successful);
351: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”) then
352: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validatied”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Corrupted Get Image”})
353: Send-Env(FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id);
354: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”) then
355: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id, ”Cor-
rupted Get Image”}, {Receiver, ”Get Image Result”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Corrupted Get Image”});
356: if Corrupt[Image]=”Active” then
357: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
358: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
359: else
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360: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
361: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
362: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
363: end if
364: Send-Env(FImage, Adversary, message = (”Get Image”, session-id,
creds, image-id));
365: end if
366: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id) then
367: RemoveBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id);
368: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Create Node Output”, session-id);
369:
370: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid, NodeExist) then
371: Send-IdealCloudOT(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
372: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id) then
373: if Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” then
374: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
375: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
376: else
377: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
378: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
379: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
380: end if
381: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
creds);
382: else if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
383: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id },
{Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id });
384: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
Compute-id, user-id, ”Delete Node”);
385: else
386: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Confirm”, session-id);
387: end if
388: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id) then
389: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
390: if FindDBRequest(session-id, Request-Message, Credential,
ServiceObject-List, Black-List, Corruption) & Corruption =”Corrupt” then
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391: creds =Credential, ServiceObject-List;
392: else
393: Credential= Generate credential for the user;
394: creds = Credential, ServiceObject-List;
395: UpdateDBRequest for session-id with the new credential value and
set Corruption=”Corrupt”;
396: end if
397: Extract credsservice from ServiceCorrupt(Service, Service-id,
credsservice) where Service=FCompute;
398: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Validation Delete Node”, session-
id, user-id, node-id }, {Receiver,”Corrupt Validated Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id });
399: Send-Env(Receiver, Adversary, ”Service Validation”, session-id,
credsservice, creds);
400: end if
401: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id, user-
id, node-id, valid) then
402: if Corrupt[Identity]=”Active” then
403: if valid= False then
404: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid}, {Receiver,”Corrupt Output Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid});
405: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
Fail);
406: else
407: RemoveBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Result Delete Node”, session-id,
user-id, node-id, valid);
408: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
409: end if
410: end if
411: else if FindBuffer(Receiver,”Corrupt Output Delete Node”, session-id, user-
id, node-id, valid) then
412: Send-IdealCloudOT(Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, valid);
413: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, Re-
questActivity) then
414: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Result Access Node”, session-id)
415: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node Access”, session-id, user-id, node-id, re-
sult, valid) then
416: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Output Access Node”, session-id)
417: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
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418: if Identity is Corrupt then
419: valid = validity setting used by SimOTulated adversary
420: else
421: valid=False
422: end if
423: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Confirm Attach Volume”, session-id, valid);
424: else if FindBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
then
425: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Result Attach Volume”, session-id)
426: else if FindBuffer(”Attach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, suc-
cess/fail) then
427: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Output Attach Volume”, session-id)
428: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-
id) then
429: if Identity is Corrupt then
430: valid = validity setting used by SimOTulated adversary
431: else
432: valid=False
433: end if
434: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Confirm Detach Volume”, session-id, valid)
435: else if FindBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, valid)
then
436: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Result Detach Volume”, session-id)
437: else if FindBuffer(”Detach Volume”, session-id, volume-id, node-id, suc-
cess/fail) then
438: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Output Detach Volume”, session-id);
439: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Service Validation”, session-id, Service-
id, user-id, node-id, valid) then
440: Send-Env (FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
service-id, Request, valid);
441: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid) then
442: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Delete Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
node-id, valid},{Receiver, ”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid});
443: Send-IdealCloudOT (”Delete Node Output”, session-id, continue);
444: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Output Delete Node”, session-id) then
445: Send-IdealCloudOT(”Output Delete Node”, session-id);
446: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image)
then
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447: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-
Image},{Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Service-id,
”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
448: Add Black-Listsession-id(FCompute);
449: Send-Env(FIdentity, FCompute, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid);
450: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id, image-
id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image) then
451: if create-valid=successful then
452: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
453: Send-Env (FCompute, FImage, ”Get Image”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
ServiceObject-List);
454: else
455: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, ”Create Node”, create-valid, ”Get Image”, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id });
456: Send-Env(FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
457: end if
458: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-id,
image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
459: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Create Node”, session-id, user-
id, image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get
Image Service Validation”, session-id, image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image});
460: Send-Env(FImage, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, FImage-id,
user-id, ”Get Image Image-id”, ServiceObject-List);
461: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validation”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
462: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validation”, session-id,
user-id, image-id, Compute-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver,
”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id, image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid,
Corresponding-Image})
463: Add Black-Listsession-id(FImage);
464: Send-Env(FIdentity, FImage, ”Service Validated”, session-id, user-id,
Fimage-id, ”Get Image image-id”, Image-valid, ServiceObject-List);
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465: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
466: if Image-valid =false then
467: Corresponding-Image=NULL
468: end if
469: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Service Validated”, session-id,
image-id, FImage-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image},{Receiver, ”Get Image
Continue”, session-id, image-id, Image-valid, Corresponding-Image})
470: Send-Env(FImage, FCompute, ”Image”, session-id, image-id, Corresponding-
Image);
471:
472: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Image) then
473: if Corresponding-Image=NULL then
474: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Imaged},{Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-
id })
475: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, NULL,
Fail);
476: else
477: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Get Image Continue”, session-id, image-id,
Image-valid, Corresponding-Imaged},{Receiver, ”Request NodeID”, session-id })
478:
479: Send-Env(FCompute, Adversary, ”Request Node ID”, session-id);
480: end if
481:
482: else if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id) then
483: RemoveBuffer (Receiver, ”Create Node Output”, session-id);
484: Send-IdealCloudOT (”Create Node Output”, session-id);
485:
486: else if FindBuffer(”Output Continue”, Service, destination, message) then
487: RemoveBuffer(”Output Continue”, Service, destination, message);
488: if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message contains
”Delete Node” then
489: Send-IdealCloudOT(Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
valid);
490: else if Service=FCompute & Corrupt[Compute]=”Active” & message con-
tains ”Create Node” then
491: Send-IdealCloudOT(Receiver, ”Create Node result”, session-id, node-
id, valid);
492: end if
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493: end if
494:
495: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id, valid)
from IdealCloudOT:
496: Service-id=Service-id for FCompute
497: UpdateBuffer({Receiver,”Delete Node”, session-id, user-id, node-id },
{Receiver, ”Delete Service Validation”, session-id, Service-id, user-id, node-id,
valid});
498: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Delete node-id ”);
499:
500: Upon receiving( ”Delete Node Completed”, session-id, Valid, NodeExist)
from IdealCloudOT:
501: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid) then
502: UpdateBuffer ({”Delete Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, node-id,
valid}, {”Output Delete Node”, session-id })
503: if NodeExist= False or Valid= False then
504: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id,
Fail);
505: else
506: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Delete Node”, session-id, node-id, Suc-
cessful);
507: end if
508: end if
509: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Get Node ID”, session-id, user-id, image-id, Node-
Structure, Corresponding-Image) from IdealCloudOT:
510: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, image-id,
”Create Node”, Successful, ”Get Image”, Successful, Corresponding-Image);
511: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node Node-Structure with ServiceObject-List ”);
512:
513: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Get Image”, Node-Structure) from IdealCloudOT:
514: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, ”Create
Node”, Successful, ”Get Image”, Fail, NULL);
515: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node Node-Structure with ServiceObject-List ”);
516:
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517: Upon receiving (Receiver, ”Create Node”, session-id, user-id, Fail, rea-
son=”Create Node”, Node-Structure) from IdealCloudOT:
518: StoreBuffer(Receiver, ”Service Validation”, session-id, user-id, ”Create
Node”, Fail, ”Get Image”, Fail, NULL);
519: Send-Env(FCompute, FIdentity, ”Service Validation”, session-id, Compute-id,
user-id, ”Create Node Node-Structure with ServiceObject-List ” );
520:
521: Upon receiving (”Create Node Continue”, session-id, user-id, valid) from Ide-
alCloudOT:
522: if FindBuffer(Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id, node-id) then
523: UpdateBuffer({Receiver, ”Node ID continue”, session-id },{Receiver,
”Create Node Output”, session-id })
524: Send-Env (FCompute, Receiver, ”Node Created”, session-id, node-id, valid);
525: end if
526: end function
6.2 Analysis
In this section, we prove Theorem 3; we explain how the OpenStack Services collec-
tively UC-realize our Ideal Cloud in the one-time token scenario. Note that properties
1 and 2 of Section 4.4 continue to hold in the one-time token case because those prop-
erties only demonstrate correctness when all services are uncompromised, in which
case there are no tokens (of any type) for the adversary to abuse. To complete the
proof, we require a new property
• Property 3’: The view of E is identical in the FCloud OneTime and the OpenStack
services even when services are compromised, as long as each observed token
can only be used one time.
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6.2.1 Property 3’: Service compromise using one-time token
model
The one-time token has two properties: 1- Scoped and 2- One-time usage. In the
OpenStack Services, because of the first property, the adversary is only able to make
requests in the defined scope and because of the second property, the adversary is not
able to reuse it to make a request to the same service. To realize these properties,
the simulator no longer stores credentials per user-id; instead, it creates and stores
one credential per each compromised session-id.
That is, when Nova is compromised, the simulator notifies the ideal cloud and
the ideal cloud sends all session-id in which the requests are either new to Nova or
not finalized. Next, the simulator creates credentials for each session-id, stores them
together with the request detail (scope) in its database for future use, and adds these
credentials to the corresponding messages as needed. In addition, because of the
second property, the simulator creates a blacklist for each session-id and adds the
services which have made a request for validation. In this way, the simulator is able
to track all service requests for validation and properly respond to the requests such
that E views identical messages from both worlds.
When an adversary uses a compromised session-id =5 with request detail of “Cre-
ateNode with image-id =2” and makes a GetImage request to Glance for image-id =2,
Glance needs to validate the credential first and then send the corresponding image.
For this case, the simulator creates all the intermediate messages until it reaches the
validation result message to Glance. If Glance has previously made a request with the
same credential for session-id =5, then the simulator will send a failed result (because
this service is in the blacklist of session-id =5 in the simulator). If the credential is
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correct, then S first adds Glance to the blacklist of session-id =5 and then S sends
the successful result. This means that if the specification of the corresponding image
related to image-id =2 changes in the future, then the adversary cannot access the
more recent and up to date information which is what happens in the OpenStack
Services.
Note that even though getting access to the most recent image specification may
not be a great interest for the adversary, but the point here is that the adversary
cannot get the updates for any other request in which the update information is
crucial.
On the hand, because of one-time token’s scope property, the simulator stores
the request detail and does not permit a request with a different scope for the same
session-id. That is (in our example), if the adversary makes a request of accessing
corresponding image of image-id =7 for session-id =5, then the simulator will send a
fail result (because the scope of this request is ”create a node with image-id =2 for
session-id =5”).
6.3 Making Security Analyses Accessible
Juxtaposing the ideal clouds in the bearer token and one-time token scenarios can be
quite illustrative. As an example, from the code of the two ideal clouds, it is easy to see
that a corrupted FBlockStorage can tamper with the delivery of an image from FImage to
FCompute during a Create Node operation in the bearer token model, whereas the same
attack is not possible in the ideal cloud for the one-time token model. Importantly,
this comparison can be observed without looking at our simulators and proofs; put
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another way, only the ideal cloud algorithms are in the trusted code base. As a result,
our analysis is accessible to the OpenStack development community, since they are
already comfortable with reading code.
More generally, the UC ideal cloud that models any suggested security improve-
ment permits OpenStack developers to understand concretely the value added by this
improvement. This is an example for how UC modeling can provide developers with a
valuable new tool that they can use to balance the relative importance of addressing
any of the numerous bug reports on their plate at any given time.
159
Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work
This work lays the foundation for a full-scope composable security analysis for the
popular cloud management framework OpenStack. It brings a number of communities
together: On the one hand, our abstract model is substantially easier to absorb
than the code of OpenStack and therefore opens OpenStack to a wider group within
the cryptography and programming languages communities. On the other hand,
our modular analysis provides the OpenStack development community with a better
understanding of the security concerns surrounding some of its core design issues as
well as (more importantly) a concise, tangible description of how the security of the
overall cloud concretely improves by making moderate software improvements. Put
differently: the modular analysis can both expose bugs and provide motivation for
the developers to address them. Importantly, our approach can also be used to assert
security, namely prove lack of flaws.
This work covers only some of the core functionality provided by a full featured
cloud. In particular, there are still many remaining features necessary for fine grained
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access control. More work is needed in order to: (a) cover more services, (b) consider
more attack (corruption) options and the security guarantees provided in these cases,
and (c) analyze implementations of the various services and the associated security
caveats and vulnerabilities.
While we leave these challenges to future work, we note that this last point is
where the power of universal composability is put to use: our model can be extended
to include internal components of services such as Compute and Storage in order
to show how these subsystems combine to realize the ideal services FCompute and
FBlockStorage that we use in this work. This level of modeling also enables clearer
discussion of the effects of single-node compromises.
Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 1, our model is easily extensible (though not
entirely modular) to add additional OpenStack components. There are four steps
involved in adding a new service to the model: create an abstraction of its own func-
tionality, apply local changes to other services that interact with the new service,
extend the ideal cloud, and augment the simulator. All of these changes are rather
straightforward, with only the simulator change being rather tedious. One future di-
rection to streamline this process is to make the simulator more modular by expressing
its current programming (which is mostly case statements based upon the messages
it receives) in a more abstract and event-driven style. Such a change would naturally
comport with another direction for future research: mechanizing the analysis, and in
particular the proofs of security.
Overall, we believe that this work provides an important benchmark to show the
feasibility of modeling large-scale software packages within the framework of Universal
Composability. Modularity was a crucial component toward keeping the models and
analyses manageable. Indeed, this work demonstrates the value of conducting similar
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analyses of other software deployments in the future.
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